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TRANSITION LOSSES IN THE ELECTRIC POWER MARKET: 

A CHALLENGE TO THE PREMISES UNDERLYING THE 

ARGUMENTS FOR COMPENSATION 

Lois R. Lupica· 
In this Article, Professor Lois R. Lupica examines whether the 
electric utility industry, currently j.n the midst of deregulation, 
ought to sustain the resulting transition losses. Due to the signifi· 
cant modification of legal rules affecting the electric power market 
and changes in regulatory policy, the utilities currently have expen­
ditures and expectations that are unrecoverable in a competitive 
market. In recent years, momentum has moved in the direction of 
compensating the electric utilities and their investors for these 
losses. Professor Lupica challenges the arguments for transition 
loBS recovery and ultimately concludes that the doctrinal premises 
in support oftransition loss recovery are flawed. 
The Article begins by examining the history of the electric 
power market and continues by addressing the central arguments 
in favor of transition loss recovery. Proponents of transition loss re­
covery argue that investors will suffer losses as a result ofa change 
in market dynamics or legal rules, and because the changes were 
not foreseeable, investors should be insulated from these resulting 
losses. Advocates of transition loss recovery further perceive the 
regulatory environment as contract-based, and thus argue that the 
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modification of the market's legal rules constitutes a breach of con­
tract. Finally, some advocates claim that changes in legal rules and 
the resulting transition losses is a taking of property under the 
Fifth Amendment. Professor Lupica addresses each of these argu
ments and contends that the premises underlying these arguments 
are faulty. She further argues that transition losses are not unique 
to this context, and that, in addition to acknowledging the doctrinal 
challenges to recovery advocates' arguments, policy makers must 
evaluate transition loss recovery as an issue of fundamental fair­
ness to utility consumers. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The electric utility industry is currently in the midst of a dra­
matic transition.' This industry has been significantly affected over 
the past decades by technological advances in both electricity 
transmission and generation.' These advances in technology, cou­
pled with shifting consumer demand and preferences, have resulted 
in a significant modification of the legal rules affecting the electric 
1. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The State ofthe Transition to Competitive Markets 
in Natural Gas and Electricity, 15 ENERGY L.J. 323, 336 (1994). 
2. See Richard F. Hirsh, Regulation and Technology in the Electric Utility In· 
dustry: A Historical Analysis of Interdependence and Change, in REGULATION: 
EcONOMIC THEORY AND HISTORY 147, 159-77 (Jack High ed., 1991) (describing the 
. central role played by technological changes in electric power generation and trans· 
· mission). Electricity is a unique commodity, even among the commodities and ser· 
vices offered by public utilities. See RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, THE CoNTROL OF 
NATURAL MONOPOLIES 19 (1979). 
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power market.' The ensuing decades will see even further changes 
in the legal regime governing this market.• 
One of the primary objectives of these rule changes is the intro­
duction of competitive participants to the wholesale and retail mar­
kets for electricity. The introduction of competition to a market that 
was previously dominated by one supplier• has had many intended 
and unintended consequences. • One such consequence is the surfac­
3. Currently, California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Montana, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, 
Texas, and West Virginia have enacted legislation authorizing the restructuring of 
the regulatory regime governing their state's electric utility market. See CAL. Pus. 
UTIL. CODE § 330 (West 2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16-244d (West 1999); 220 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16-111 (West 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A § 3200 
(West 1999); MAss. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 164, § lA (West 1999); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 460.6n (1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 69-8-101 (1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 374­
F:1 (1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 190.1 (West 1999); 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 
2801 (West 1996); R.I. GEN. LAws § 39-1-1 (1956); TENN. CODE ANN. § 3-15-801 
(1999); TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 31.003 (West 1999); W.VA. CODE§ 24-2-18 (1999). 
In addition, at least a dozen stetes have retail access legislation pending or under 
legislative discussion, and many more have initiated pilot programs to study the 
issue. See generally Strategic Energy Ltd. (visited July 27, 1999) 
<http://www.sel.com/SE_Frames.htmi>. 
4. See Pierce, supra note 1, at 336 . 
5. Electric utility firms, in their respective markets, possess what is known in 
economic terms as natural monopolies. In such a situation, one large provider 
emerges as the sole provider of a good or service. In such markets, prices may be 
higher and output may be more restricted, as compared to a competitive environ­
ment. Because one firm dominates the market, the consumer is forced to settie for 
that firm's version of quality and service. Furthermore, because most consumers ~re 
small and most suppliers are relatively large, the costs of litigating any controversy, 
if the goods or services provided are inadequate or deficient in some way, are more 
likely to exceed the expected recovery. See ALAN STONE, REGULATION AND ITS 
ALTERNATIVES 68, 74 (1997). Because, in general, there is not a great deal of varia­
tion in types of energy the existence of a monopoly supplier may not appear, at first 
glance, to be a critical issue for relatively fungible goods such as electricity. But see 
Armond Cohen, Energy Project Director, Conservation Law Foundation, Remarks at 
the Electric Industry Restructuring in the Northeast: A Regional Perspective Pro­
ceedings (May 31-June 1, 1996) (discussing the issue of renewable energy sources); 
see also SCHMALENSEE, supra note 2, at 19; STONE, supra, at 69. In circumstances 
where conditions lead to natural monopolies, many legislatures believed that the 
creation of a regulatory agency, as representative of the public's interests, was nec­
essary to ensure that monopolistic providers offered adequate quality of service at 
just and reasonable rates. See STONE, supra, at 68-69. 
6. Electricity is of critical importance in our culture. Electricity is a necessity 
and there is no close substitute for most of the product provided. Furthermore, elec­
tricity cannot be economically stockpiled or stored by the consumer for use during 
times of low supply or increased prices, leading to what is known, in economic terms, 
as a market with low elasticity of demand. See STONE, supra note 5, at 69. The 
United States comprises five percent of the world's population, yet it produces 
twenty-six percent of the world's electric energy. See CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE 
REGULATION OF PuBLIC UTILITIES 623 (3d ed. 1993). There are currently 3500 public 
653 2000] TRANSITION LOSSES 
ing of transition losses.' Transition losses in the context of the elec­
tric utility market restructuring, also referred to as "transition 
costs" or "stranded costs,"' have been defmed as investments made 
on the basis of one set of circumstances and assumptions that, be­
cause of changes in these circumstances (such as technology and 
market demand), are currently unrecoverable.• Transition losses 
have· also been descriptively defined as the "anticipated shortfall in 
net revenues under competition as a consequence of changes in 
regulatory policy ."10 The realization of these obligations is a conse­
quence, or fall-out, of the transition from a monopolistic to a com­
petitive market." 
and private companies involved in the generation, transmission, and/or distribution 
of electricity in the United States but only 100 to 200 of these firms supply seventy­
five to eighty percent of the power used. See PAUL L. JOSKOW & RICHARD 
SCHMALENSEE, MARKETS FOR POWER, AN ANALYSIS OF ELECTRIC UTILITY 
DEREGULATION 11 (1983) (citing Federal Regulatory Energy Commission (1981)); 
Comments of Nancy Brockway, N.H. Pub. Utilities Comm'r, July 9, 1999 (on file 
with author) [hereinafter Brockway Comments]. See generally ROBERT A. CARO, THE 
YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON, THE PATH TO POWER (1982) (describing the hardships 
of life in rural Texas without electricity). 
7. The privatization movement in Europe and South America offers many illus­
trations of transition losses. For example, in privatizing countries, the capital in­
vestment in obsolescent manufacturing facilities and the unrealized pension benefits 
of redundant workers become immediately realizable liabilities upon the sale of an 
enterprise from the state to a private party. The realization of these obligations is a 
consequence, or fall-out, of the transition from the public to the private sector. The 
issue that emerges in the course of this transition, is which affected party-the 
state, the firm, or the public-ought to pay for these transition losses. See generally 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PuBLIC SECTOR REFORM AND PRIVATIZATION (Ezra N. 
Suleiman & John Waterbury eds., 1990); Ronald A. Cass, Privatization: Politics, 
Law and Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REV 449, 457 (1988). 
8. But see Christopher Garbacz, Neuer, Neuer Use the "S" Word! Always Say· 
"Losses," PuB. UTIL. FORT., Dec. 1996, at 16-18 (describing the widespread and mis­
leading usage of the term "stranded" as applied to coats, assets, etc.). 
9. See infra Part III for a discussion of the type of!oases included in the term 
"transition losses." 
10. J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of 
the Regulatory Contract, 71 N .Y.U. L. REV. 851, 869 (1996) [hereinafter Sidak & 
Spulber, Deregulatory Takings]. 
11. See, e.g., Steve Coli, Economic Change, Social Upheaval; Governments Cut­
ting Welfare Benefits, Selling State-Run Firms, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 1994, at A1 
("[S]cores of state-owned businesses, once regarded as the crown jewels of European 
states, are being auctioned off, one after another, to private buyers. The ·effects on 
the jobs and lives of workers are profound and often painful .... As Europe's state­
owned behemoths slim down to compete in the private sector, they are likely to shed 
about 750,000 jobs by 1998 ...."); see also Debbie Harrison, Continental Europe, 
Time Bomb Still Ticking, FIN. TIMES (London), May 14, 1998, at 4 ("The transition 
from state to private-funded pensions will be slow and will incur considerable costs .. 
. . "). 
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There is no universally understood definition of transition 
losses, nor is there consensus on the types of obligations included 
within the term. Indeed, the most commonly used reference for such 
losses, stranded costs, masks the fact that what is at issue are 
losses and obligations owed, not costs. The rhetoric surrounding 
this issue has the potential to mislead the parties engaged in the 
resolution of the allocation of responsibility for these losses and 
may have far reaching consequences: transition losses in the elec­
tric power industry have been estimated to be as high as $200 bil­
lion." 
Much has been written about the deregulation of the electric 
utility industry, including a body of scholarship addressing the 
question of which party should bear the transition losses incurred 
(or identified) as the industry moves from a regulatory to a competi­
tive environment." A careful and critical examination of the transi­
12. See Sidak & Spulber, Deregulatory Takings, supra note 10, at 861; see also 
Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 59 Fed. Reg. 35, 274, 35, 278 (1994). 
13. See generally J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY 
TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT 444-45 (1998) (noting the failure of the 
FCC and state public utilities to consider the use of transition bonds in securing 
recovery of" stranded" or transition losses); William J. Baumol & Thomas W. Merrill, 
Deregulatory Takings, Breach of the Regulatory Contract, and the Telecommunica­
tions Act of 1996, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1037, 1037 (1997) (contending that the utilities 
must bear the loss of monopolistic prices); John Burritt McArthur, Cost Responsibil­
ity or Regulatory Indulgence for Electricity's Stranded Costs?, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 775, 
783-85 (1998) (stating that utility companies should not be fully liable for stranded 
losses, but they also should not be completely compensated); Elizabeth A. Nowicki, 
Denial ofRegulatory Assistance in Stranded Cost Recovery in a Deregulated Electric­
ity Industry, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 431, 431-32 (1999) (arguing that former monopo­
lies should be denied recovery for their stranded costs); Sidak & Spulber, Deregula­
tory Takings, supra note 10 (asserting that governments should be liable for the 
effects of their regullitory measures); J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Givings, 
Takings and the Fallacy of Forward-Looking Costs,- 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1068, 1071 
(1997) [hereinafter Sidak & Spulbur, Giuings, Takings and the Fallacy] (maintaining 
that the government is obligated to reimburse utilities "just compensation" for losses 
due to the regulators' change in regulatory policy); Stephen F. Williams, Deregula­
tory Takings and Breach of the Regulatory Contract: A Comment, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1000, 1000-05 (1996) (stating that the utilities do not need to be reimbursed to com­
pete with new companies); Oliver E. Williamson, Deregulatory Takings and Breach 
of the Regula!ory Contract: Some Precautions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1007, 1011 (1996) 
(maintaining that it "depends" whether or not utilities should be compensated for 
stranded costs); Leigh H. Martin, Note, Deregulatory Takings: Stranded Investments 
and the Regulatory Compact in a Deregulated Electric Utility Industry, 31 GA. L. 
REV. 1183, 1220 (1997) (arguing that utilities should be permitted to recover any 
investments that were made in reliance of the "regulatory compact"). But see Jim 
Chen, The Second Coming of Smyth v. Ames, 77 TEx. L. REV. 1535, 1548 (1999) 
(reviewing and critiquing Sidak & Spulber's DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE 
REGULATORY CONTRACT: NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES); Jim Rossi, 
The Irony of Deregulatory Takings, 77 TEX. L. REv. 297, 298-99 (1998). Indeed, the 
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tion loss definition offered by those advocating for transition loss 
recovery reveals, at its baseline, an assumption about entitlement. 
The premise is that utilities have a continuing right to a certain set 
of economic conditions. These conditions include the benefits that 
flow from a regulated market. There is no harm in recognizing and 
acknowledging the expected changes that will result from a change 
in the legal climate. The claim that utilities ought to be fully com­
pensated by others for each and every liability resulting from 
changed circumstances, however, should be viewed with suspicion." 
For the most part, the literature on the transition loss issue has 
failed to put in a broader context· the compelling interests of the 
parties subject to the transition of this market. Every transition 
results in winners and losers and the question of which party 
should "win" implicates normative concerns. It is a choice that is 
informed by both efficiency and fairness considerations. This Article 
looks at the transition loss issue in the electric power market re-
argument that the state has a legal obligation to provide utilities with a reasonable 
opportunity to recover stranded costs from ratepayers and that if the state does not 
permit stranded cost recovery, it will be "taking" utility property, has been used by 
utilities advocating their position before state legislatures. See The Maine Legisla· 
ture Committee on Utilities and Energy, Forum #2 Stranded Costs and Securitiza­
tion, Topic of the Day, David T. Flanagan, Central Maine Power at 14 (on file with 
author). United States Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer has acknowledged 
that the "stranded assets" issue is a political problem with no "technical answer" and 
offered his solution to the stranded asset problem: 
(l]t would be possible to produce a lot of electricity and lower the rates 
quite a bit [after deregulation), but for the fact that you have to pay 
something for the stranded assets. But my impression from the com­
panies is that nobody expects to get 100%. Maybe they would like 
100%. What they are worried about is that they are going to get noth­
ing. If that is really so, put them in a negotiating forum and work out 
these technical problems. That way they could use their incredibly 
good negotiating skills and produce some kind of solution. If prices be­
gan to fall at little bit, I think the average person would think that 
was the miracle of the century-to actually see a price coming down. If 
in fact that began to happen, even a little bit, I suspect the public 
would have tremendous confidence in whatever form of institution 
brought that about. 
Conference, Harvard Electricity Policy Group: Regulatory Decisionmaking Reform, 8 
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 789, 837 (1995). 
14. A comparison of the proposed treatment of transition losses in the ~lectric 
utility industry to the treatment of such losses in the market for natural gas reveals 
an interesting contrast. In the deregulation of the natural gas industry, costs of gas 
supply contracts at above-market prices were at risk of being unrecoverable. As a 
result of political pressures, as well as pressure brought in the form of lawsuits, the 
losses were split between the interstate pipeline companies and local gas distribu­
tion companies. In some states, however, the local distribution companies were al· 
lowed to recover their share of these losses from the consumers. See Donald F. 
Santa, Jr. & Clifford S. Sikora, Open Access and Transition Costs: Will the Electric 
Industry Transition Track the Natural Gas Industry Restructuring?, 15 ENERGY L.J. 
273, 303-04 (1994). 
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structuring context and questions the underlying premises of many 
of the arguments offered by advocates of transition loss recovery. 
Part II of this Article describes the history of the market for 
electricity and examines some of the evolutionary changes in tech­
nologies and· market forces that have resulted in regulation, re­
regulation, and de-regulation. Part III addresses the transition loss 
issue in the electric power industry and outlines the primary argu­
ments offered by transition loss recovery advocates. Part IV ex­
plores the electric utility industry's transition loss issue from a 
broader perspective, summarizing the current scholarship on tran­
sitions and retroactive effects in a wide variety of situations. Much 
of this scholarship explores the question of whether there ought to 
be a significant distinction made between transition losses that 
arise from changes in legal rules and transition losses that are the 
result of market forces. Part IV then looks at alternative policy 
choices and asks (and attempts to answer) the question of whether 
the common transition loss allocation determination advocated by 
most utilities is the most prudent and efficient policy choice. The 
analysis of transition loss allocation in Part IV takes both an ex 
ante and an ex post perspective. Part V examines the predicate as­
sumption implicit in many of the arguments for transition loss re­
covery, which is that such recovery naturally flows from a breach of 
the so-called "regulatory contract." Part V argues that, under basic 
common law contract doctrine, there is no basis for treating the 
prior regulatory arrangement as contractual in nature. Part VI ex­
amines the relationship between the consumer market and the 
regulated utility from a property rights perspective, challenging the 
notion that a change in regulatory policy instigated by technological 
and market changes rises to the level of a taking under the United 
States Constitution. Finally, in Part VII, this Article concludes that 
the issue of transition loss allocation and the premises and assump­
tions underlying the arguments made in favor of recovery by the 
utility investors must be re-examined by policy analysts, econo­
mists, scholars, and politicians in light of the broader issues that 
are implicated. · 
This Article takes no position as to the merits of the restructur­
ing of the electric power market. Moreover, an analysis of the pros · 
and cons of the enacted and proposed changes to the federal and 
state regulatory schemes is beyond the scope of this Article. The 
allocation of transition losses in connection with the re·regulation of 
the electric power market, however, is fundamental to the issue of 
whether the benefits of the market's restructuring are confined to 
the industry, or whether the benefits of a competitive market will 
be more widespread. 
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II. 	 THE ELECTRIC POWER MARKET IN TRANSITION-CHANGES IN 
TECHNOLOGY, MARKET DEMAND, AND THE LEGAL RULES 
The electric power market, with its rich history of regulation" is 
currently in the midst of a significant transition. 16 This transition 
15. Electricity is the quintessential public utility and has been subject to some 
form of regulation since before the beginning of the century. The Industrial Revolu­
tion sparked a surge in the demand for electricity. At that time, there were few, if 
any, controls on its delivery to the public. One view of the origin of the market's 
regulation credits its roots in the opportunism of a few electric plant owning "robber 
barons." For example, in 1905, a New York state legislative committee investigation 
revealed that New York Gas and Electric was charging its customers a per kilowatt­
hour rate for electricity that was twice what it cost to produce. See PETER NAVARRO, 
THE DIMMING OF AMERICA, THE REAL COSTS OF ELECTRIC UTILITY 3-4 (1985). Ac­
cordingly, because of utility owners' overreaching and the growing necessity of this 
commodity, the populists and progressives began to take an interest in the industry, 
which resulted in the emergence of a new form of regulatory entity-state public 
utility commissions (often known as PUCs). See generally WILLIAM T. GORMLEY, THE 
POLITICS OF PuBUC UTIUTY REGULATION 6-7 (1983); NAVARRO, supra, at 3-5; 
PHILLIPS, supra note 6, at 661. 
At the time of their inception, PUC control was perceived by many as the 
preferred alternative to corrupt, local governance of the public utility markets. Util­
ity companies themselves supported PUCs as theoretically independent and impar­
tial bodies, with many industry leaders finding them preferable to local municipal 
authority and the chaos of the unregulated market, which included the risk of eco­
nomic losses. Public utility commissioners' responsibilities included the setting of 
policy with respect to many technologically, economically and politically complex 
issues. See NAVARRO, supra, at 4-6. 
As the electric utility industry became more evolved and service areas 
crossed state lines, the federal government began to take a greater interest in the 
market and demonstrated this interest through the enactment of federal legislation. 
In 1935, Congress enacted the Public Utility Holding Company Act ("PUHCA" or the 
"Holding Company Act"). See PHILUPS, supra note 6, at 239. The Holding Company 
Act authorize.d the reorganization of electric utility firm structures by limiting the 
operations of each company to a single integrated public-utility system-known as 
vertical integration. See id. at 632-35. This means that the same entity generated, 
transmitted, and distributed power to the retail customer. See id. 
In the decades following the enactment of PUHCA, in large part due to a 
growing population and considerable technological advances, the demand for elec­
tricity in the U.S. increased exponentially. See id. at 9. Technological developments 
in energy generation and transmission as well as economies of scale, resulted in 
increasingly larger firms generating, transmitting, and distributing electric power. 
Accordingly, most markets for electricity were served by a single, dominant firm. In 
recent years, Congress has enacted the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act and 
the Energy Policy Act of 1992-both designed to address inefficiencies and irregu­
larities in the regulated market. See infra notes 53-73 and accompanying text. 
16. Historically, in the wholesale market, electric utilities have been engaged in 
three vertically integrated functions: generation, transmission, and distribution. 
One utility has commonly generated, transmitted, and ultimately distributed elec­
tric power to the customer. In contrast, under the current deregulatory initiatives, 
utilities will disaggregate these three functions. Many utilities will. purchase whole­
sale electricity from generating facilities for distribution over their own transmission 
658 RUTGERS LAWREVIEW [Vol.52:649 
has come about because of modifications (and proposed modifica­
tions) in the 'legal rules governing the market for elect;ricity, which 
have tracked changes in technology and the economics of the mar­
ket." Moreover, the public's relationship with the regulated market 
has changed over time. These transitions have been affecting the 
industry since the mid-1970s, when a long period of electricity de­
mand shifts began.'• 
From the time of the Industrial Revolution up until the early 
1970s, •• it was forecast that electricity demand would increase with 
every decade."' Indeed, the utility companies, working in concert 
with manufacturers of home appliances, actively promoted the in-
lines to the consumer. Power providers will enter new markets and compete for 
wholesale business in an unregulated environment. It is expected that transmission 
and distribution of power will remain regulated to ensure that all power providers 
will have access to existing transmission systems. See Asgar Zardkoohi, Competiti<>n 
in the Production ofElectricity, in ELECTRIC POWER: DEREGULATION AND THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST 63-66 (John C. Moorhouse ed., 1986) [hereinafter ELECTRIC POWER); see 
also Electric Power Generation Components, in The Changing Structure of the Elec­
tric Power Industry: An Update, (visited Nov. 12, 1998) 
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg_str/chapter3.html>. 
17. See Testimony of Peter A. Bradford on Behalf of the Maryland Office of Peo­
ple's Counsel Before the Maryland Public Service Commission, Case Numbers 8794 
& 8804 (December 1998) [hereinafter Bradford Testimony) (on file with author). 
There was a steadily increasing demand for electricity from the mid-1930s to the 
1970s. See Hirsh, supro note 2, at 155. This increased demand resulted in burgeon­
ing energy plant construction. See id. Based in part on this historical record, experts 
from both the private and public sectors forecasted that demand for electricity would 
double in the ten years from the early 1970s to the early 1980s and that nuclear 
power facilities would be less expensive to operate than traditional oil and gas fueled 
plants. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in Retro· 
spect: Canceled Plants and Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 500-01 (1984). 
As a result, utilities began to construct a record number of nuclear-fueled genera­
tors. See id. at 502. These capital-intensive investments were based upon the predic­
tion that there would be a steady increase in demand for electricity in the years to 
come. See id. at 500 (citing Energy Information Admin., U.S. Dep't of Energy, Nu­
clear Plant Cancellations: Causes, Costs, and Consequences at 7, 16 tbl.5). 
18. See Bradford Testimony, supro note 17, at 34-37. 
19. John C. Moorhouse said, in his introduction to the anthology Electric Power, 
that "the 1970s witnessed a series of events that disrupted domestic energy markets. 
Sharp increases in oil prices worldwide, price controls and contrived fuel shortages 
at home, comprehensive environmental regulation, accelerating inflation. and un­
usually higb costs of raising capital each contributed to what become known as the 
'energy crisis.'" John C. Moorhouse, Introduction: The Uncertain Future of the Elec­
tric Power Industry, in ELECTRIC POWER, supra note 16, 1, 1. 
20. Electricity usage grew from 1900 to 1920 at a rate of 12% per year. See 
RICHARD F. HIRSH, TECHNOLOGY AND TRANSFORMATION IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC 
UTILITY INDUSTRY 82 (1989). From 1920 until l!i73 (with a growth set-back during 
the Great Depression) electricity usage grew 7% annually. See id. 
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crease in electricity usage." These utility usage campaigns needed 
to be successful; they created an adequate demand for the electric­
ity generated by the regularly improved technologies. 22 
Moreover, as early as the beginning of the century there devel­
oped what has been referred to as the "dominant design" of the elec­
tric utility industry-known as the grow-and-build-strategy." This 
strategy was based on the premise that the growth of efficient new 
technologies would result in lower per-unit costs of electricity only 
as the number of the utility's customers, and their usage, was in­
creasing." Thus, utility management realized early on that they 
could take full advantage of new technological developments in 
scale economies only in the absence of competition."" This realiza­
tion led to initiatives by the utilities themselves to encourage the 
perception that the electricity market was a natural monopoly. In 
that way, regulatory oversight could be exchanged for the exclusive 
rights to generate and transmit electricity to individual markets.'" 
21. See Hirsh, supra note 2, at 155. Utilities used the "grow and build" program 
to encourage residential, commercial, and industrial customers to use electricity. See 
id. Utilities launched the "Live Better Electrically" campaign, and offered customers 
electric hot water heaters and other electric appliances at discounted electric rates. 
See id.; see also Bob Harris, Not Just Selling Railroad Tickets, in MOONLIGHT IN 
DUNELAND, THE ILLUSTRATED STORY OF THE CHICAGO SOUTH SHORE AND SOUTH 
BEND RAILROAD 21-26 (Ronald D. Cohen & Stephen G. McShane eds., 1998) (describ­
ing the poster-based marketing campaign initiated by Samuel Insull glorifying the 
destinations reachable by the Chicago South Shore and South Bend Railroad, in 
order to stimulate railroad usage). 
22. See Hirsh, supra note 2, at 155. 
23. See HIRSH, supra note 20, at 16-21. 
24. See id. 
25. See Hirsh, supra note 2, at 150-51. Economist George Stigler said in an in­
fluential article, "regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and oper­
ated primarlly for its benefit.• George J. Stigler, The Theory ofEconomic Regulation, 
2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971). See generally FOREST MCDONALD, lNSULL 
(1962) (describing the life of Samuel Insull, the man considered the father of gov­
ernmental regulation of the electric power industry). 
26. Enterprises have been defined as natural monopolies when they "supply, 
directly or indirectly, continuous or repeated services through more or less perma­
nent physical connections between suppliers' plants and the premises ofconsumers." 
STONE, supra note 5, at 69. Another way of saying this is that a natural monopoly is 
present when there are high or initially costly barriers to entry into the market, and 
where unit costs of the product or service decline as output increases. Alan Stone 
used the following example to illustrate this point: "If, for example, an electric gen­
erator costs $1 million and constitutes a very large proportion of a firm's total costs, 
average costs will clearly be lower if fixed costs are amortized over sales of 1 million 
units than over sales of 100,000 units.• ld. at 70. Furthermore, electric companies 
have to string (or bury) wires from the point of electricity generation to the point of 
consumption of every customer. "The lowest cost between two points is obtained with 
a single, high voltage transmission line.• fd. at 71; see also SCHMALENSEE, supra 
note 2, at 152. The conclusion that natural monopolies are flawed markets in need of 
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AB described in the biography of Samuel Insull, an early leader in 
the electric utility industry and a proponent of public utility regula­
tion, a legal monopoly could justify investments in large-scale gen­
erating technologies, resulting in both cost savings and increased 
profits for the utility investors." 
This explanation for the regulation of an industry, known as the 
"capture theory," views regulation as a force that provides signifi­
cant benefits to firms within the regulator's purview.'" Implicit is 
the conclusion that regulation is a result of the more powerful and 
organized entity's influence and that regulated firms benefit by vir­
tue of the regulatory framework. Accordingly, regulation is a com­
modity, available to be captured by constituencies with sufficiently 
cohesive interests and the resources to capitalize on these inter­
ests." Regulators supply rent-creating regulation in return for po­
litical favors offered by the demanding firms,30 thereby redistribut­
ing wealth from some consumers to the effective coalitions." The 
efforts of the leaders of the electric utility industry to encourage 
regulation were successful and an elaborate regulatory scheme was 
enacted at both the state and federal levels." During the years lead-
regulatory assistance has not been universally accepted, however. Harold Demsetz 
has put forth the argument that, in the absence of collusive behavior, there are 
enough potential rival market participants waiting in the wings to compete that the 
dominant provider will be influenced by these potential competitors to charge a 
competitive price. See Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities, 11 J.L. & EcoN. 55, 
55-60 (1968). As such, Demsetz concludes, even a natural monopoly market ought 
not be regulated. See id. 
27. See McDONALD, supra note 25, at 113-24. Commonwealth Edison Company, 
headed by Insull, was able to expand its reach into over one hundred suburban Chi­
cago communities while having to yield only to the direction of one state utility 
commission, rather than to each municipality's individual brand of governance. See 
id. at 127-28. 
28. Such. benefits include the imposition of barriers to market entry, "as well as 
price supports. Expenditures made by regulated firms on encouraging, maintaining, 
and manipulating the regulatory process are treated by such firms as the cost of 
doing business. See STONE, supra note 5, at 70-71; see also Thomas W. Merrill, Cap­
ture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1039, 1043 (1997). 
29. See Stigler, supra note 25, at 3-21. Economist Peltzman expanded on Stig­
ler's theory of capture by recognizing the potential for effective coalitions of con­
sumer~voters. See generally Steven P. Croley, Theories ofRegulation: Incorporating 
the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1998). 
30. See Stigler, supra note 25, at 4-5. 
31. See Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public 
Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 169 
(1990). 
32. There are myriad alternative theories of regulation. The classic politically­
based theory is known as the public interest theory of regulation. Proponents of this 
theory believe that regulation comes about because of the deliberate influences of 
interest groups. These interest groups may.include the regulated industry, consum­
ers in general, and those consumer sub-groups with a special interest in the regu­
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lated market. See Croley, supra note 29, at 5. Moreover, proponents of the public 
interest theory of regulation identify two primary influences on regulatory outcomes: 
(1) the degree of political stability of the regulators, and {2) the extent to which the 
general citizenry can monitor regulators for effective decision making. See id. at 65­
67. These theorists distinguish. the respective interests of the regulated market 
participants and believe that the extent to which each interest group has influence 
on regulators' positions determines the degree and type of regulation. See id. This 
perspective on regulation recognizes that the more politically precarious position a 
regulator is in, the more susceptible he/she is to such political influence. See id. at 
68-71. 
The coalition building theory of regulation, a variation on the public interest 
theory, similarly rests on political influence to explain regulatory outcomes. Its pro­
ponents, however, view regulation as a tool for wealth redistribution; equity and 
fairness, rather than efficiency concerns, drive regulatory decision making. See 
Harry M. Trebing, Equity, Efficiency, and the Viability ofPublic Utility Regulation, 
in APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES IN PuBLIC UTILITY INDUSTRIES 25-26 
(Werner Sichel & Thomas G. Gies eds., 1981). Disciples of this theory believe that 
regulators are less vulnerable to constituency pressure and are more likely to weigh 
and balance the concerns and relative merits expressed by each special interest 
group. See id. Accordingly, regulated markets achieve optimal equity and efficiency. 
See id. Furthermore, implicit in this view is the assumption of a market where con­
sumers are vulnerable to the effects of market imperfections and where regulators 
are willing to make adjustments to equalize the effects of these imperfections. See 
id. This theory addresses the evil of economic inefficiency while recognizing that 
efficiency should not be the singular goal in a market for a good that is a necessity. 
See id. Political coalitions form when regulators use prices or rates to favor a par­
ticular constituency. See id. Correspondingly, groups whose favor is not sought must 
pay prices substantially in excess of costs. See id. 
Shortcomings of the coalition building approach include: (1) it provides little 
basis for evaluating the overall societal effects of regulation; (2) the nature of the 
coalition formed will be a factor of the regulators in control at a given time-thus as 
tenures change, objectives shift; and (3) in the absence of regulation, a monopoly 
firm will have the incentive to build a coalition in support of its monopoly position. 
See id. at 27. Such a firm would charge lower rates to some customers and higher 
rates to others, thus engaging in a cross~subsidization. See id. 
A variation of the coalition building theory is known as the equity stability 
theory. See id. at 28. Its advocates support regulation even in efficient markets and 
conclude that in certain circumstances, it is beneficial and appropriate for regulators 
to place a higher value on fairness, social values, and stability than on market effi­
ciency. See id. at 28-29. Thus, regulation ought not be introduced solely because of 
the inefficiency of markets (market failure) but rather because the free markets do 
not place a premium on consumers' social welfare. See id. The equity-stability theory 
offers a justification for regulation and regulatory behavior that places the virtues of 
equity and fairness in a superior position, relative to efficiency concerns. See id. The 
equity-stability theory of regulation is implicit in Professor Theodore Lowi's concep­
tion of judicial democracy. Professor Lowi observed that modern law has become a 
series of instructions to administrators rather than a series ofcommands to citizens. 
See THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 287-314 (1969). See generally 
STEPHEN J. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 3 (1982) (criticizing the regula­
tory process as being undemocratic and illegitimate); MARTHA DERTHICK & PAUL J. 
QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION 40-41 (1985) (describing how the govern­
ment policed the regulatory agencies); IRA MAGAZINER & ROBERT B. REICH, MINDING 
AMERICA'S BUSINESS 6 (1982) (stating that politically powerful industries are in­
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ing up to the late 1960s, the industry saw some significant techno­
logical advances. Electricity was transmitted at increasingly higher 
voltages." In addition, metallurgy technology resulted in greatly 
improved thermodynamic efficiency, meaning that each metallurgi­
cal improvement led to more electricity production from a fixed 
amount of fuel.,. These advances led to a declining capital and fuel 
investment per unit of output which in turn led to greater cost sav­
ings for the consumer"'-so long as demand was increasing." 
Moreover, nuclear-related technological advances led, for the 
first time, to widespread development of nuclear power plants. Par­
tially in response to the United States' dependence upon oil, as well 
as to meet the projected demand for electricity, construction began 
on scores of nuclear powered generation facilities in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s." Striving to be competitive with fossil-fuel­
powered plants and taking advantage of government subsidies and 
manufacturers' incentives, utilities developed nuclear plants on a 
large scale, in reliance on projections of continued increases in elec­
tricity demand and in hopes of benefiting from scale economies.'" 
In the 1970s, however, significant world and market events led 
to the beginning of a series of changes in the public's demand for 
electricity and the beginning of a period of corresponding changes in 
the legal rules regulating the market. First, the Arab oil embargoes 
of the early 1970s resulted in a decrease in the supply of oil89 and a 
strumental in determining the extent of government intervention); STONE, supra 
note 5, at 13 (asserting that interest group liberalism corrupts and immobilizes 
democratic government); Michael A. Crew & Charles K. Rowley, Feasibility ofDe­
regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, in DEREGULATION AND DIVERSIFICATION OF 
UTILITIES 6 (Michael A. Crew ed., 1989) (examining the political economy of regula­
tion); Croley, supra note 29, at 4 (questioning whether administrative agencies effec­
tively fill "statutory gaps"); Levine & Forrence, supra note 31, at 169 (asserting that 
rent-creating regulation obtained as a political favor redistributes wealth from con­
sumers to effective coalitions of firms). 
33. See Hirsh, supra note 2, at 153. 
34. See id. 
35. For example, in 1892, electricity consumers paid 316 cents per kilowatt-hour, 
and in 1967, they paid seven cents per kilowatt-hour (inflation adjusted to 1986 
dollars). See id. at 156 (citing EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, POCKETBOOK (30th ed.) 
and 1988 Statistical Report, ELECTRIC WORLD 202 (1988)). . 
36. From 1899 to 1953, the electric utility industry's productivity growth rate 
was 5.5% annually. See id. This industry grew during this period at a rate that was 
more than three times greater than the rate of growth of the country's private econ­
omy in general. See id. 
37. Over 100 nuclear-fueled generating plants have been canceled since the early 
1970s. See Moorhouse, supra note 19, at 1-2. 
38. See HIRSH, supra note 20, at 61-62. 
39. Together with coal, oil was one of tlie primary fuel sources for electricity 
generation. See id. at 58. 
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corresponding increase in oil prices."' Second, developers of many of 
the in-process and recently completed nuclear plants found them­
selves in financial difficulties. These plants proved to be expensive 
to build and many of them came in way over budget. As a conse­
quence, the cost per kilowatt hour of nuclear power-generated elec­
tricity was considerably higher than the cost for power generated 
with alternative fuels. Third, under the direction of state Public 
Utility Commissioners ("PUCs"), pursuant to the Public Utilities 
Regulatory Policies Act ("PURPA") requirements, utilities entered 
into contracts to purchase electricity at the same rate it cost them 
to generate it." Since many of these contracts were entered into at a 
time when oil was the lowest cost fuel (notwithstanding its rela­
tively high cost compared to current-day oil prices), oil-powered 
generation became the benchmark for pricing purchased power. At 
the same time, industrial electricity customers, responding to the 
high cost of electricity, began to seek an alternative to the expensive 
power being offered by the ·utility monopoly holders. Many larger 
industrial customers threatened to build their own power genera­
tion plants. 
.In part as a result of increasing electricity prices, and contrary 
to forecasts, customer demand for electricity leveled off by the late 
1970s." Moreover, the public's awareness of energy conservation 
opportunities was heightened, and its behavior began to reflect the 
emerging environmentally conscious values ... For the first time, it 
became clear to economists studying this market that the demand 
for electricity was responsive to price." During this same period, the 
public's concerns about the safety and environmental effects of nu­
clear energy contributed to its disenchantment with nuclear power. 
This resulted in even greater financial troubles for investors in nu­
clear power plants. By the early 1980s, many nuclear facilities rep­
40. It was further thought that the United States' dependence on oil was a 
threat to our national security given our precarious relationship with the Organiza· 
tion ofPetroleum Exporting Countries ("OPEC"). See infra note 57 for a discussion of 
OPEC; see also Pierce, supra note 17, at 501 (asserting that relying on oil exposes 
the United States to future embargos). 
41. This pricing mechanism is known as the "avoided cost" method. See infra 
note 58 for a discussion ofthe avoided cost-pricing methOdology. 
42. Less than half of the increased demand for electricity materialized. This was 
due to demand sensitivity to increasing price, as well as to consumer enlightenment 
about the benefits and effects of energy conservation measures. See Comments of 
Stephen Ward, Public Advocate, State of Maine (Feb. 23, 1999) (notes on file with 
author). 
43. See HIRSH, supra note 20, at 112 (describing the public's mounting environ­
mental awareness). 
44. See John T. Wenders, Effickncy, Subsidy, and Cross-Subsidy in Electric 
Utility Pricing, in ELECTRIC POWER, DEREGULATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, 
supra note 16, at 307, 31F312. 
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resented excess generation capacity, .. which led to further cancella­
tions of a number of partially completed projects ... 
The economic effects of the cancellation of so many costly pro­
jects were significant." It has been estimated that the construction 
costs of abandoned energy generating plants were as high as $60 
billion ... Utilities sought financial refuge from their heavy nuclear 
plant-related obligations in the form of utility rate increases. Utili­
ties made the case to their PUCs that these investments had been 
made based upon projections, albeit in hindsight faulty ones, of de­
mand for electricity." Arguing that the shift in demand was not 
anticipated and that their investments were "stranded," the utilities 
sought compensation for these stranded losses ... 
In response to these arguments, PUCs convened what became 
known as a series of "prudence hearings" to address the questions of 
whether the utility management's investment decisions in such 
plants was sound and whether the utility should be responsible for 
these losses. 61 PUCs failed to hold in all cases that the public ought 
to make the utilities whole and utilities came to realize that full 
reimbursement for all investments made by them was not a cer­
tainty." 
45. The accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear plant in March 1979, had the 
effect of shattering the public's confidence in nuclear power. See, e.g., Wayne IGng, 5 
States' Voters Decide on Atomic Energy Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1980, at A16 
(noting that voters are signaling "concern about all phases ofnuclear development"); 
Not Three Mile Island, But ... , N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1980, at A26 (stating that a 
nuclear water accumulation at Indian Point nuclear power plant "only further un­
dermine[d) public confidence in [nuclear energy) management"). 
46. See Pierce, supra note 17, at 504. 
47. The following were cited as consequences of energy generation plant cancel­
lations: 
In 1984 the Washington Public Power Service System defaulted on 
$2.5 billion in debt service payments, and Cleveland Electric Illumi­
nating Company, Public Service of Indiana (PSI), and Consumer 
Power Company (Michigan) each abandoned costly plants in various 
stages of completion. (PSI's $7 billion Marble Hill Plant was 50 per­
cent built when scrapped). Other utilities such as Georgia Power and 
Duke Power (North Carolina) have found it prudent to sell existing 
generating capacity to improve their finances. At least one investor­
owned utility, Long Island Lighting Company, considered bankruptcy. 
Moorhouse, supra note 19, at 2. 
48. See Moorhouse, supra note 19, at 2. 
49. See id. 
50. See id. 
51. Utilities are typically required to demonstrate that plants are "used and 
useful" before the cost of the plant can be included in the rate base and passed on to 
the consumer. There is considerable variation among states, however, in their appli­
cation of this standard. See id. 
52. For example, Consolidated EdisoQ., the utility serving the New York City 
metropolitan area, began construction on a nuclear power facility in 1955 (known as 
the Indian Point Plant). See HIRSH, supra note 20, at 152. The budget for this pro­
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In 1978, Congress responded to this changing market63 with the 
enactment of the PURPA." Congress's ostensible purpose in enact­
ing PURPA.. was to promote energy conservation'" and the devel­
opment of new environmentally friendly energy generation tech­
nologies. Moreover, Congress wanted to decrease reliance on foreign 
fuel sources•' and encourage non-utility competitors to the electric­
ity generation market, in part to provide customers with fairer elec­
tricity rates.68 
ject was $55 million. See id. When the project was ultimately completed in 1962, its 
development costs were $127 million. See id. Its cost to produce electricity was $450 
per kilowatt (k W) of capacity, as compared with the comparable conventional cost of 
$190 per kW. See id. At the prudence hearing convened to review the extent to 
which these costs could be recovered from utility consumers, the New York Public 
Service Commission withheld more than $100 million from its rate base. See id. The 
testimony of a nuclear physicist at the prudence hearing referred to the investment 
decisions of the utility as "imprudent." See id. 
53. Factors which Congress found influential in its decision to enact PURPA 
included (1) the country's dependence on foreign oil sources, (2) rising electricity 
prices, (3) decreasing efficiency in the use of their generating capacities, and (4) 
environmental concerns related to the development of nuclear power plants. See 
PHILUPS, supra note 6, at 655-56. 
54. The Department of Energy ("DOE") was created in 1977 and was granted 
jurisdiction and authority over all energy-related matters regulated by the federal 
<government. See id. at 655. 
55. The utilities challenged PURPA in two cases that were ultimately reviewed 
by the Supreme Court. See American Paper Inst. v. American Elec. Power Serv. 
Corp., 461 U.S. 402, 417 (1983) (holding that PURPA's rule requiring utilities to 
purchase electricity from qualifying facilities at their "avoided cost" was not arbi­
trary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion); Federal Energy Comm'n v. Mississippi, 
456 U.S. 742, 769-70 (1982) (holding that PURPA's directives to state legislatures 
and utility commissions do not violate the lOth Amendment). 
56. PURPA addressed the issue of energy conservation through the structure of 
setting rates. See Implementation of tlu< Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 
1978: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the House Comm. on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong. 1 (1979) (statement of John Dingell, 
Subcommittee Chairman). 
57. The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries ("OPEC") is a per­
manent, intergovernmental organization, created in 1960, by five oil-producing coun­
tries. It currently has eleven member countries. OPEC's objective is "to co-ordinate 
and unify petroleum policies among Member Countries, in order to secure fair and 
stable prices for petroleum producers; an efficient, economic and regular supply of 
petroleum to consuming nations; and a fair return on capital to those investing in 
the industry." Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, A Brief History of 
OPEC (visited Apr. 24, 1999) <http://www.opec.org/history.htm>. 
58. PURPA required utilities to purchase electric power from qualifying generat­
ing facilities (known as "QFs"). IfQFs sell power to utilities at what it would cost the 
utility to generate that electricity, they are not subject to rate regulation; all other 
independent power producers (i.e., non-qualifying generating facilities) are subject 
to rate regulation under the Federal Power Act. This pricing system is known as the 
"avoided cost." Avoided costs may include both energy and capacity costs. FERC 
explained this pricing system as follows: 
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PURPA also removed the disincentive for those industries with 
co-generation capabilities (industries that produce steam for indus­
trial purposes and have the capability to produce electricity for both 
use and sale)'" to sell their surplus electricity. The co-generators 
were not subject to state regulation of electricity rates and service 
and those smaller generating facilities capable of producing not 
more than eighty megawatts were allowed access to the utility­
owned transmission grid.60 
Notwithstanding PURPA's allowance of limited competition to 
the market for electric power, transmission and distribution lines 
were still owned and controlled by monopoly holders; this served as 
a disincentive for further development of generation technologies by 
non-utility independent producers."' Not until access to the trans­
mission and distribution grids to all power producers was mandated 
could there be competition at the wholesale and retail level. 
Congress responded to an increasing demand for such access, as 
well as to some of the criticisms of PURPA,62 with the enactment of 
the Energy Policy Act of 1992 ("Energy Policy Act").63 The Energy 
Policy Act empowered the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERCl"' to order vertically integrated.. electric utilities to deliver 
power generated by competitors across their transmission lines to 
wholesale customers ... As a result, all independent generators now 
• 
The essence of avoided cost pricing is that payments to the QF should 
reflect the payments that would have been made to the sources of 
power that were displaced by the QF, that is, the costs avoided by pur­
chasing QF power. Avoided cost pricing encourages efficiency and in· 
novation, because QFs get any difference between their own costs and 
the avoided cost rate. The utility's ratepayers are indifferent in the 
short run because the utility pays no more for the QF's power than it 
would pay for generating its own power or purchasing power from an· 
other source. · 
Administrative Determination of Full Avoided Costs, Sales of Power to Qualifying 
Facilities, and Interconnection Facilities, Fed. Energy Guidelines (FERC) 'II 32,457, 
at 32,163 (proposed Mar. 22, 1998) [hereinafter Administrative Determination of 
Full Avoided Costs]. 
59. Cogeneration has been "[d]efined as the sequential use of steam for indus­
trial purposes and for production of electricity. • Hirsh, supra note 2, at 165. 
60. See id. 
61. See id. at 167. 
62. One of the unintended consequences of PURPA was that as industrial cUB· 
tomers generated electricity, rates increased for those residential and commercial 
customers who remained customers of the utility. See id. 
63. 16 U.S.C. § 791-828c (1994). 
64. FERC has responsibility for the control of interstate transmission rates and 
the wholesale sale of electricity. Retail electric power rates are subject to the juris­
diction of the individual states' PUCe. See PHILLIPS, supra note 6, at 648-49. 
65. See supra note 15 for a discussiqn of the concept of vertical integration. 
66. This is known as "wholesale wheeling.• The requested transmission access, 
however, must be able to be provided without compromising reliability and must be 
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have the legal right to access the transmission network's poles and 
wires for the sale of power at the wholesale level. 
Moreover, the Energy Policy Act created a new category of inde­
pendent power producers, called "exempt wholesale generators" 
("EWGs"), that could generate electricity and sell power at whole­
sale (but not at retail), free from the Holding Company Act" restric­
tions.68 These EWGs quickly became direct competitors of the mar­
ket's existing power suppliers, which further altered the former 
monopoly market's stability ... 
Large power customers advocating for direct access to these 
smaller, more efficient power generators have made progress in 
recent years toward gaining direct access to these independent non­
utility power producers.'• Many more states are considering legisla­
tion to encourage retail electricity generation competition." The 
legislation typically mandates access to transmission facilities by 
competitive independent generators so that they can deliver power 
directly to retail residential, commercial, and industrial custom­
ers.'' This federal and state intervention (or de-intervention) has 
sparked a very public debate about the wisdom of creating a com­
petitive electricity industry and the process by which it should be 
achieved. A central strand of the debate has been the issue of the 
treatment of the incumbent utilities' transition losses.'' 
in the public interest. See 16 U.S.C. § 824j(b); see also PHILLIPS, supra note 6, at 648­
49. 
67. See supra note 15 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Public Util­
ity Holding Company Act. 
68. See PHILLIPS, supra note 6, at 658. 
69. Thus, the Energy Policy Act had the effect of removing legal barriers to the 
development of independent power projects free of wholesale rate regulation and of 
ensuring them access to transmission systems. An electric-generating facility may 
file an application with the FERC requesting an order for wholesale transmission 
access. The parties independently negotiate the terms of this access arrangement, 
which must be approved by FERC. FERC has the authority to issue a wholesale 
wheeling (meaning access) order if it is "just and reasonable ... and in the public 
interest." Administrative Determination of Full Avoided Costs, supra note 58, 'I 
32,157. 
70. See supra note 3 for an illustrative list of states with legislation ordering the 
study or enactment of deregulatory measures affecting the electric power industry. 
71. While many state legislatures have referred to the impending changes in the 
electric power market as deregulation, a more accurate term is re~regulation or re­
structuring; even if all the modifications to the regulatory structure being discussed 
are enacted in every state, the market is being opened to competition only at the 
energy generation level-transmission and delivery of electricity will still be pro­
vided by a market monopoly holder. See, e.g., supra note 3. 
72. See PHILLIPS, supra note 6, at 685-86 n.164 (citing Lori A. Burkhart, Con­
gress Passes Wide-Ranging Energy Bill, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Nov. 1, 1992, at 72). 
73. See West/Southwest Regional Meeting, Comments of Ms. Simon, Depart­
ment of Energy, Electricity Deregulation (Oct. 22, 1996) (on file with author). 
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III. TRANSITION LOSSES IN THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 
Transition losses in the context of the electric power market 
generally fall into three basic categories:" (1) obligations incurred to 
carry or abandon redundant or obsolete energy generation plants; 
(2) other expenditures not recoverable under competition, including 
deferred investments in energy generation plants, deferred taxes, 
and retiree benefit costs; and (3) contractual obligations to purchase 
electricity from third parties at above market prices." More broadly, 
transition losses are anticipated shortfalls in net revenues as a re­
sult of the introduction of competition.'• These losses have been es­
timated to be as high as $200 billion. 
The momentum is moving in the direction of transition loss re­
covery." For example, in both California and Massachusetts, a line 
item labeled "transition costs" is included in each consumer's 
monthly electricity bill.78 Dozens of other states have either enacted 
legislation providing for consumers to absorb the utilities' transition 
losses, or are in the process of studying the issue." 
Transition loss recovery advocates have put forth a series of 
arguments and assertions that, on their face, appear compelling. 
Many of these arguments, however, are based upon faulty premises 
and flawed predicate assumptions. Moreover, the electric utility 
transition loss issue has not been debated in light of the broader 
societal context in which it belongs. The transition loss issue is not 
unique to the electric power industry-indeed, the phenomenon is 
74. What can and should be included under the title of transition losses has 
been, and continues to be, subject to debate among industry participants. See 
Brockway Comments, supra note 6. 
75. Among the obligations unrecoverable by utilities in a competitive market are 
the lpng term contracts to purchase pPWer which were entered into during a period 
when the avoided cost pricing baseline was at a historical high. Because these obli­
gations were not incurred at the initiation of the utilities, but mandated by PURPA, 
the arguments against recovery by the utilities are not applicable to this category of 
transition losses. 
76. · The effort on the part of utilities to gain recovery of these losses has been 
compared to the recent federal bailout of the Savings and Loan industry. See Paul 
Fenn, Stranded Costs (visited Apr. 25, 2000) <http://www.local.org/stranded.htmb; 
see also Pierce, supra note 17. at 497; Pierce, supra note 1, at 336. 
77. In March 1998, the Clinton Administration released a proposal encouraging 
states to provide recovery for transition losses. While this proposal was not success­
ful, it was one of many position papers advocating that utilities be held harmless 
from the consequences of the transition from monopoly supplier to market competi­
tor. See Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 18 C.F.R. § 35.28 (1999) (omitting 
proposed recovery scheme). 
78. The bill for a Massachusetts customer for one month's usage was $50, which 
included transition loss compensatior;J of $11.30-22.6% of the total bill. See Boston 
Edison Invoice (Jan. 26, 1999) (on file with author). 
79. See supra note 3. 
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quite common and there is much to be learned from how transition 
losses are addressed in other contexts and markets. 
One of the central claims made by transition loss recovery advo­
cates is that it is inefficient not to compensate investors who have 
incurred losses as a result of a transition or change in market forces 
or legal rules. These advocates argue that denial of transition loss 
recovery raises the cost of capital to the industry80 and that this will 
chill investors' enthusiasm for investment in similarly situated 
firms in the future."' Moreover, recovery advocates argue that fail­
ure to compensate former monopoly holders for their transition 
losses provides a competitive advantage to potentially less efficient 
electricity suppliers entering the market... Therefore, compensation 
is the only efficient solution to the quandary the incumbent utilities 
find themselves facing on the advent of the restructuring of the 
market. 
A further argument in favor of transition loss recovery is based 
upon the twin notions of foreseeability and reliance upon the status 
quo. Recovery advocates claim that the current instability of the 
electric utility market was not anticipated or foreseen. Further­
more, they argue that utility investors relied upon the statutorily­
provided guaranteed aggregate return in making their investments, 
and are therefore entitled to recover the full measure of their in­
vestment."' 
The argument that has gained the greatest favor among transi­
tion loss recovery advocates is based upon the idea that legislation 
authorizing the regulation of the electric utility market constitutes 
a contract. Accordingly, a modification of this legislation arguably 
constitutes a breach of such contract and the damages for breach 
are the losses resulting from the transition... Proponents of this 
argument claim the existence of an affirmative agreement in which 
utilities agreed to provide service to a given market, in return for a 
competitive rate of return from their market's customers ... 
Moreover, it is argued, the breach of this "regulatory contract," 
in the absence of compensation for damages incurred, constitutes a 
taking of private property in violation of the Fifth Amendment of 
the Constitution ... The related "takings" argument that property of 
80. See William J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, Stranded Costs, 18 HARV. J.L. & 
PuB. POL'y 835, 839 (1995). 
81. See id. at 839-40. 
82. See id. at 836. 
83. See id. at 843-44. 
84. See id. at 840-41. 
85. See id. at 841. 
86. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation."). 
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the utility has been taken by virtue of the change in legal rules that 
has affected the utility's expected return on its investments has also 
been made. 
Parts N, V, and VI below will address each of these arguments 
in turn. Part IV will argue that the transition loss issue must be 
analyzed in a broader context to fully understand the implications 
of cost recovery. An ex ante examination of the electric utility mar­
. ket during the period of regulation reveals the utilities' inefficient 
decision making, which was premised in part upon the flawed as­
sumption of an infinite entitlement to the benefits that flow from 
regulation. If the assumptions about transition loss recovery that 
were made by the electric utilities are internalized and adopted by 
other industries, inefficiencies will proliferate. A comparison of the 
electric power market to other environments in which transition 
losses or their equivalent (what are referred to as "retroactive ef­
fects") have surfaced reveals not only the ubiquity of this issue, but 
also alternative approaches to its efficient and fair resolution."' 
87. One form of transition loss recovery that utilities have been heavily promot­
ing is known as securitization. There have been several recent articles toutip.g secu· 
ritization's merits in connection with utility transition loss recovery. See, e.g., Lois 
R. Lupica, Asset Securitization: The Unsecured Creditor's Perspective, 76 TEx. L. 
·REv. 595, 597 n.5 (1998). While securitization as a method of raising working capital 
is not without its risks to both investors and third party creditors of the originator, 
there are some unique risks associated with a utility using securitization to recoup 
transition losses. See generally id. The first issue goes to the nature of the property 
to be securitized. 
Typically, the assets transferred by originators in connection with a securiti­
zation are enforceable contract rights to payment, commonly known as "receivables. • 
See id. at 599-600. In contrast, utilities are considering (and in some cases are en­
gaged in) securitizing a portion of future consumer utility payments. There are a 
number of problems and risks unique to securitization in the electric utiJ.ity context. 
See The Regulatory Assistance Project, Stranded Costs and Other Risks to Look Out 
For, ISSUESLETI'ER (1995) (visited Jan. 30, 2000) <http://www.rapmaine.org/ 
stranded.html>. 
First, even if one were to accept the idea that transition losses ought to be 
paid for up front by a third party (meaning the state or the consumer) instead of 
being absorbed by the utility investors, such obligations, by their forward-looking 
nature, are difficult, if not impossible, to accurately estimate; they will fluctuate 
with changing market conditions. Unforeseeable future events could impact market 
prices for electricity as well as for the plant assets, and this would result in a sharp 
variation in the actual dollar value of these losses versus the up-front estimate. See 
id. 
Arriving at an estimate determining an appropriate treatment of transition 
losses is a significant public policy decision because of the decisive economic and 
equitable impact variations in estimates will have upon consumers. The utility con­
sumer's primary concern ought not be the "costs" that have become stranded, but the 
"costs" that are at risk of becoming stranded in the future. This issue has been 
dubbed one of recovery of "strandable costs;• thus highlighting the difficulty in up­
front, irrevocable recovery of these obligations. See id. 
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Part V will refute the argument that the regulation of the elec­
tric power industry constituted a contract. The underlying premises 
to the contract-based arguments are flawed: the basic doctrinal 
elements necessary for contract formation were not present.88 More­
over, even assuming the existence of a validly created contractual 
arrangement, there is no explicit or implicit contractual term pro­
viding for transition loss recovery. 
Part VI will address the claim that deregulation of the electric 
utility market is a taking under the Fifth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution. There can be no taking in the absence of a 
property right. What is being declared as property by transition loss 
Inherent biases characterize the indicators of changing market prices. This 
is because long-term projections are susceptible to influences which come out of 
current market conditions. The recent surplus in capacity and relatively depressed 
market prices for electricity in part informed predictions about the current magni­
tude of transition losses. It is important to note that even a prediction of slightly­
lower-than-actual market prices in the future could result in a significant overesti­
mation of the total. See id. 
The uncertainty associated with any estimation of transition losses is a sig­
nificant issue because of the irrevocable nature of a securitization arrangement. 
When the expected consumer utility payments are sold, it is on a non-recourse basis; 
they are not merely used as collateral in connection with a loan. Once sold, they 
become the property of the Special Purpose Corporation and are used to support 
payments to asset-backed security investors. Such investors are guaranteed a rate of 
return for the life of the security. While there is most often a credit enhancement 
mechanism put in to place to make up for any shortfall in customer payments from 
the predicted amount, the principal amount of the asset-backed security is fixed. The 
irrevocable nature of securitized asset transfers limits the ability of the market to 
discipline or revisit the amount oflosses seeking to be recovered through securitiza­
tion. See id. What results is a significant risk shift from utilities to consumers. It is 
because of this risk shift that securitization is touted as beneficial to utilities and 
asset-backed security investors. 
·In the legislation enacted in California providing for a state-supported credit 
enhancement, the state is to provide the "opportunity" for recovery of these losses, 
whereas the securitization documentation made reference to a "guarantee" of recov~ 
ery. See Walter R. Hall II, Securitization and Stranded Cost Recovery, 18 ENERGY 
L.J. 363, 371-72 (1997). 
Michigan Attorney General Frank J. Kelley has stated, "'Only two groups 
will benefit from issuance of rate reduction bonds: the utility, which will receive the 
billions in proceeds, and Wall Street, which will receive millions in fees.m !PALCO 
White Paper Critical of"Securitization• Swindle-High Cost Utilities Use Scheme to 
Charge Customers for Future Losses (visited July 22, 1998) 
<http://www .ipalco.com!COMPETITION/Swindle/swindlewp.html> (citing Written 
Comments of Attorney General Frank J. Kelly in Response to Staff Report on Elec­
tric Industry Restructuring, In the Matter, On the Commission's Own Motion, To 
Consider the Restructuring of the Electric Utility Industry, Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm. 
Case No. U-11290, Jan. 21, 1997, at 14); see also Lupica, supra, at 606-09 (discussing 
the strengthening relationship between the public utilities sector and the financial 
industry). · 
88. See discussion infra Parts V & VI. 
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recovery advocates is nothing more than, at most, an expectation 
that a certain state of affairs will continue.•• Moreover, even if a 
property right belonging to the utility is recognized, a change in the 
regulatory structure, to the degree contemplated, is within the prov­
ince of the State's inherent police powers and does not rise to the 
level of an unconstitutional compensable taking. Accordingly, tran­
sition loss recovery either from·the consumer, or the government, 
cannot be had. 
IV. TRANSITIONS IN A BROADER CONTEXT 
One of the claims being made by advocates of transition loss re­
covery is that competition may "jeopardize the financial solvency of 
the public utility""' unless such losses are either shared by all firms 
in the competitive market or "explicitly reimbursed by some third 
party."" What many recovery advocates fail to recognize, either ex­
plicitly or implicitly, is that transition losses surface upon the hap­
pening of many different types of changes." Indeed, when any in­
vestment is made based upon one set of circumstances and assump­
tions, and subsequently there is an unexpected change in such cir­
cumstances or assumptions, a portion of the amount invested may 
become "stranded" as a result of the transition. Much scholarship 
has been devoted to the subject of transition and retroactivity ef­
fects of changes in market, legal rules, and circumstances in gen­
eral." The conceptual framework outlined in this literature offers a 
89. See discussion infra Part VI. 
90. Sidak & Spulber, Deregulatory Takings, supra note 10, at 858. 
91. Id. 
92. See, e.g., Kyle D. Logue, Tax Transitions, Opportunistic Retroactivity, and 
the Benefits ofGovernment Precommitment, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1129, 1129-32 (1996) 
(describing transition losses that occur upon a change in the tax law). 
93. See generally Ronald A. Case, Judging: Norms and Incentives ofRetrospec· 
tive Decision-Making, 75 B.U. L. REv. 941, 948-66 (1995) (discussing the differences 
between retrospective and prospective decisions by judges); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & 
Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity and Constitutional Remedies, 104 
HARv. L. REv. 1733, 1738-49 (1991) (addressing the consequences of retroactivity in 
criminal cases); Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Ap­
proach, 110 HARV. L. REV 1055, 1058 (1997) (asserting that the equilibrium theory 
is the appropriate framework for analyzing retroactivity); Michael J. Graetz, Legal 
Transitions: The Case ofRetroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47, 
48 (1977) [hereinafter Graetz, The Case ofRetroactivity] (examining the difficulties 
in "setting effective dates for changes in the income tax laws"); Michael J. Graetz, 
Retroactivity Revisited, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1820, 1822 (1985) [hereinafter Graetz, 
Retroactivity Revisited] (arguing that prospective changes in law have a retrospec-' 
tive impact); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis ofLegal Transitions, 99 HARv. L. 
REv. 509, 558 (1986) (arguing for the "implementation of a consistent predictable 
transition policy"); Saul Levmore, The Case for Retroactive Taxation, 22 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 265, 273-91 (1993) (discussing the benefits of retroactive application of tax 
laws); Logue, supra note 92, at 1129; Stephen R. Munzer, A Theory of Retroactive 
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useful point of departure for examining the transition loss alloca­
tion issue in the context of electric power industry's restructuring. 
An example of the transition loss issue commonly noted by 
scholars involves the losses sustained by taxpayers upon a change 
in the federal income tax law."' The classic illustration involves the 
repeal of the tax exemption for interest on state and local bonds ... 
Since the effect of such repeal would be to deflate the value of these 
bonds, bondholders suffer transition losses to the extent the return 
on their investment is less than what they expected it to be at the 
time of the bond's purchase.06 Notwithstanding the potential for 
substantial investor losses, the government does not provide com­
pensation for their losses." They are deemed to be part of the fore­
seeable risk borne by every investor. 
Another context in which transition effects have been felt is in 
the field of international finance. In recent years United States 
banks, acting as investors, have sought, and the United States gov­
ernment has provided, compensation for investors who have in­
curred losses in connection with their investments in Mexico, South 
Korea, and Russia, releasing them from the effects of their decisions 
to invest in such markets. 98 The decision to compensate these inves­
tors has been severely criticized by those who believe that these 
same investors reaped the benefit of high interest rates attendant 
to these initially high-risk loans and thus should not be shielded 
from the risk inherent in their decision making.99 If the investors 
knew that they would not have to bear the downside risk of their 
investment decisions, they would have had the incentive to engage 
in imprudent decision making with substantial up-side and very 
little downside potential. 
In the electric power market, utilities invested in generation fa­
cilities and incurred myriad other obligations based upon circum­
stances in place at that time and forecasts of the future. As with all 
investments, the value was contingent upon events in the future. 
The extent to which external conditions diverged from investor pre­
dictions resulted in investment gain or loss. Therefore, almost any 
Legislation, 61 TEx. L. REV. 425, 425 (1982) (defending the retroactivity in Iegisla· 
tion); Warren J. Samuels, Commentary: An Economic Perspective on the Compensa· 
tion Problem, 21 WAYNE L. REv. 113 (1974) (addressing the various issues concerned 
with the compensation problem). 
94. See Logue, supra note 92, at 1130. 
95. See id. at 1133. 
96. See id. 
97. See id. at 1136. 
98. See Barry Eichengreen, Bailing in the Private Sector: Burden Sharing in 
International Financial Crisis Management, 23 SPG FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 57, 
57-59 (1999). 
99. See id. at 57. 
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unanticipated discovery, change in market conditions, or modifica· 
tion in governing law affects the value of the investor's assets. Such 
unanticipated changes will also affect the value of the investments 
of competitors or those enterprises seeking to compete with the in­
vestor. 
The competitive market would respond to a utility's excess ca­
pacity by depressing prices and, correspondingly, investor return. It 
would not allow a financial return on such excess capacity and 
would not provide recovery for investments that do not result in 
productive assets. The market provides an incentive for prudent 
and unbiased decision making and an inducement to invest heavily 
in accurate and unbiased forecasting.' 00 If the solution to the elec­
tricity industry's current transition loss problem were to mirror the 
expected course taken in a competitive market, then utility inves­
tors ought to bear these losses. This solution provides the appropri­
ate incentives for utilities not to overinvest in capacity and to invest 
heavily in objective market trend forecasts. 101 
In an important article, Professor Louis Kaplow makes the fun­
damental observation that the transition loss issue is not confined 
to losses that are incurred as a result of changes in governmental 
policies or even confined to the context where a statute provides for 
specific retroactive application.102 In our dynamic economy, inves­
tors are subject to many types of risk that they have no ability to 
accurately forecast or control.'03 Kaplow refers to these as "market 
risks"'"' and posits that markets operate most efficiently when in­
vestors bear both the full measure of their losses and reap the full 
benefits of the risks taken.'"' 
As Kaplow initially· observes, competitive markets are not 
known for their qualities of forgiveness. 106 In such markets, mis­
takes are not forgiven, compensation is not offered when premises 
upon which investment decisions are made tum out to be fallacious, 
and firms are required to live with their imperfect forecasts of fu. 
ture trends. 101 Conversely, rewards for wise decision making, correct 
and prudent forecasts, and valid premises are doled out by the 
market for the benefit of firm owners. If the investing firm underin­
vests in forecasting tools or simply guesses wrong, it has to live 
100. See Pierce, supra note 17, at 525-26. 
101. See id. at 526. 
102. See Kaplow, supra note 93, at 515·16. 
103. See id. at 525. 
104. ld. at 533. 
105. See id. at 529. 
106. See id. at 531-33. 
107. Bee id at 533; see also Pierce, supra note 17, at 524-25 (describing the burden 
of investment costs as being born principally by the utility and not the consumers). 
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with its losses. There is no generalized mechanism for the bail-out 
of a firm's failure to anticipate changed circumstances.'08 Because 
market actors are on notice that they are subject to external risks, 
rational actors take steps to protect their investments against harm 
from such risks. For this reason, many market risks are specifically 
insured against, through traditional commercial insurance markets, 
investment diversification, and the use of more exotic financial 
hedging mechanisms."" 
Moreover, Kaplow notes the ubiquity of transition loss con­
cerns. 110 He observes that, in addition to "market risks" and the 
classic cases of retroactive legislation and judicial lawmaking, there 
are. many rule changes to which investors are subject that have the 
effect of altering the "value of prior investments simply because the 
future value of such investments ... depend[s] upon what rules 
[were] then in force."m Indeed, most investments are not entered 
into and concluded instantaneously and completely; in many in­
stances, the closing of a transaction signals the beginning of a com­
plex relationship that is subject to myriad variables over time. 
Among these variables are the legal rules in effect at the time the 
transaction was consummated as well as the rules that are going to 
be in effect throughout the duration of the legal relationship formed 
by the transaction. 
Such investments include not only contracts which obligate par­
ties over a period of time, but also transactions to purchase physical 
assets.'" The value of a physical asset over time will depend upon a 
variety of factors. For example, in the case of an investment in a 
108. See Graetz, Retroactioity Reoisited, supra note 93, at 1823-24. This author 
makes a distinction between changes in governmental policies to effectuate an inten­
tional wealth redistribution and those losses that come about as an unintended 
inciilent of action taken by the government. See id.. at 1824-25. Whereas, for exam­
ple, changes in the tax laws are intentional efforta on the part of the government to 
redistribute resources, any compensation offered by the government to offset losses 
would have the effect of nullifying the desired result regardless of whether a firm 
could anticipate and plan for the effect. See id.. at 1826. In contrast, an incidental 
loss (such as the construction of a municipal facility on privately owned property) 
would require compensation because, presumably, the government's actions could 
not be accurately foreseen or predicted, and therefore, not planned for and compen­
sation would not necessarily vitiate the statutory objective. Cf. id. (noting that the 
larger the loss from a change in the law, the greater the need for compensation in 
the interests of fairness); see also Samuels, supra note 93, at 116-17. 
109. See Alan C. Shapiro & Sheridan Titman, An Integrated Approach to Corpo­
rate Risk Management, in REVOLUTION IN CORPORATE FINANCE 215, 215 (Joel M. 
Stern & Donald H. Chew eds., 1986) (evaluating various hedging mechanisms as an 
investment in a firm's stability). 
110. See Kaplow, supra note 93, at 515. 
111. Id. 
112. See id. at 516. 
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commercial office building, the property's value will depend upon, 
inter alia, the state of the economy in general, the strength of the 
commercial rental market, interest rates, applicable tax rules, envi­
ronmental circumstances, as well as the public's response to the 
amenities offered by the property."' To the extent there is diver­
gence between the condition of the forecasted variables and reality, 
unanticipated losses may be sustained. These losses are transition 
losses-losses incurred as a consequence of an unplanned for and 
unpredicted change in circumstances. 
Kaplow concludes that from the perspective of the investor, such 
market risk is functionally similar to the risk that the government 
will modify the legal rules in effect."' Each presents the risk that 
due to unforeseen changes, investments may not have the value 
initially predicted. In both cases, because investors are on notice 
that circumstances may change, their decision making 'to invest 
reflects an assumption of such risk."' Furthermore, changes in legal 
rules are made on a less random basis than market changes and 
can be predicted and anticipated, especially by those most likely to 
be affected by the changes. When legal rules change in response to 
both demand and supply market shifts, there is even greater notice 
to the affected parties!" 
A. The Transitioning Electric Utility Market 
Much of Kaplow's argument is based on principles of efficiency. 
Efficiency analysis involves the calculation and evaluation of the 
costs and benefits of a given policy choice. m Most economists and 
law-and-economics scholars agree that an efficient policy is one that 
results in the maximization of resources. 
In the electric utility restructuring context, the threshold ques­
tion to be addressed in evaluating the efficiency of a transition loss 
policy is which party-the government, the consumer, or the util­
113. See generally GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE 
TRANSFER, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT, CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 1992) (ex­
plaining real estate finance law using theoretical and practical underpinnings). 
114. See Kaplow, supra note 93, at 512-13, 534-35. 
115. But see Fisch, supra note 93, at 1056 (arguing that it is fairer for investors to 
bear the retroactive effects of a change of legal rules in contexts where legal rules 
are in flux). 
116. To illustrate, in their consideration of the issue of the effect of a retroactive 
change in tax laws, scholars have argued that "absent any convincing empirical 
showing that the losses from political change are disproportionately distributed or 
more burdensome on productive output than market-reflected changes," efficiency 
criteria does not require compensating measures to firms affected by a change in 
legal rules. Kaplow, supra note 93, at 534. 
117. Efficiency has been defined as tbe elicitation of tbe "maximum output from 
available inputs, including capital, labor, equipment, and raw materials." STONE, 
supra note 5, at 66. 
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ity-ought to bear the losses attendant to the transition from regu­
lation to competition. The correlative question is which policy choice 
results in the maximization of economic and social resources. The 
analysis of who should bear the losses must be linked to larger con­
cerns of social policy. 
There are two perspectives from which to view and analyze this 
question: (1) an ex ante perspective, raising the question of which 
policy choice results in the utility's most efficient behavioral choices 
(a predictive perspective); and (2) an ex post focus on the positive 
and negative effects of each policy choice. This section will explore 
which policy choice (to compensate utilities or not to compensate 
utilities for transition losses), from both an ex ante and an ex post 
perspective, leads to the most efficient decision making. 
1. 	 The Ex Ante Perspective-Efficient Choices and 
Efficient Decision Making 
The ex ante efficiency-based argument is premised on the notion 
that investors will behave differently if they know that they will be 
insulated from some of the market risks of their investments. 118 
When investors are not required to weather the full and real effects 
of their decisions, they are more likely to make riskier or imprudent 
investments.119 This phenomenon is referred to in economic litera­
ture as the problem of the "moral hazard"-meaning that there is a 
distorted incentive structure in place that motivates investors to 
make suboptimal choices because they do not bear the adverse 
consequences of these choices."' 
Moreover, investors, as reasonable economic actors, anticipate 
the possible risk of loss. 121 Within the calculation of the fair market 
value of an investment is capitalized the risk of diminution of value 
due to changes. Therefore, compensating investors for changes in 
market value in the event of an adverse change in circumstances is 
tantamount to compensation for a loss that never occurred."' 
118. See Kaplow, supra note 93, at 526-27. 
119. See id. 
120. See generally ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW-A 
GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCtAL 
PRACTICES 695-703 (1988) (discussing moral hazards in reference to insurance poli­
cies); see also Laurent L. Jacque, The Asian Financial Crisis: Lesson from Thailand, 
23 SPG FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 87, 90 (1999) (describing the moral hazard prob­
lem as part of the incentive structure presented to banks who invested their money 
in Thailand, under the assumption that they would be held harmless). 
121. See generally Thomas S. Ulen, Symposium, Still Hazy After All These Years, 
22 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1011 (1997) (reviewing WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY 
TAKINGS: LAw, ECONOMICS AND POI;ITICS (1995)). 
122. See id. 
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Conversely, the prospect that firms are subject to the conse­
quences that flow from their decisions and forecasts-including 
their predictions regarding changes from the status quo and their 
expectations of the future-serves as an incentive to invest in fore­
casting tools and to consider the full array of risk-minimizing 
mechanisms available to it. It also forces careful and prudent deci­
sion making and a consideration of both the long term and short 
term risks. Thus, making investors bear the real costs and benefits 
of their decisions provides both positive and negative incentives for 
careful decision making."' 
As is the case in all other industries, profit-related incentives 
·have had a profound effect upon decision making by electric utili­
ties.•" The pace and type of generation technology developed in re­
sponse to the rate and profit structure that was defined by the regu­
latory framework. 125 To illustrate, throughout much of the century, 
regulation at the state level was concerned with the setting of prices 
for the public and establishing of a rate of return for investors. In 
order to establish these rates, regulators focused upon what is 
known as the utility's "rate base," which is the total value of all of 
the utility's capital expenditures.128 Utilities were permitted to 
charge the public a "fair rate of return"1" based upon their rate 
base, plus the public's share of current expenses for fuel and la­
bor.128 This regulatory formula provided the incentive to invest in 
capital intensive technology as a means to establish a greater rate 
base from which to calculate a "fair" rate of return. 129 Given that 
utilities were monopoly providers of electricity, capital intensive 
technologies developed on increasingly larger scales!80 These in­
vestments, in many cases, resulted in greater profits for utility in­
123. The rule of avoidable consequences says that resources are scarce and rules 
should encourage people to conserve resources. See generally Amanda Kay Esquibel, 
The Rule ofAuoidable Consequences in Antitrust Cases: A Law and Economics Ap­
proach, 26 HOFSTRA L. REv. 891, 894 (1998) (stating that the rule discourages wast­
ing a party's resources). 
124. See HIRSH, supra note 20, at 82-84. 
125. See id. 
126. See Hirsh, supra note 2, at 157. 
127. See Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 
U.S. 679, 690-92 (1923); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 546-47 (1898). The Supreme 
Court defined "fair rate of return" as a return which allows the utility investor to 
recover its market cost of capital. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas, 
320 u.s. 591, 602 (1944). 
128. See Hirsh, supra note 2, at 157. 
129, See Harvey Averch & Leland Johnson, Behauior of the Firm Under Regula­
tory Constraint, 52 AM. EcON. REV. 1052, 1052-69 (1962); see also Hirsh, supra note 
2, at 157. · 
130. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text. 
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vestors than comparable investments in labor coupled with invest­
ments in smaller-scale technologies.'" 
Advocates of compensation for losses related to these capital in­
vestments claim that such investments were made to ensure ade­
quacy of service to the public, and were therefore made in the public 
interest.'" Given the incentive structure inherent in the regulatory 
scheme and the utilities' reasonable response to it, this argument 
rings hollow. While utilities had an obligation to provide adequate 
service, they also had a wide range of choices as to how to provide 
such service. When choices were made in the interest of profit 
maximization and such profits were realized and maximized over 
time, the utility owners ought to bear the associated risks of these 
choices. 
This conclusion is even more compelling if one accepts the no­
tion that a regulated industry is more likely than a competitive one 
to overinvest in capital assets."' Professor Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 
referring to the concept of transition losses as "mistakes in retro­
spect,""• has argued that the regulatory process itself leads a regu­
lated firm to overinvest.',. Borrowing froin economists and regula­
tory theorists Harvey Averch and Leland Johnson,,,. Pierce observes 
that regulated utilities have an incentive to overinvest in capital 
assets not just because the traditional rate-setting and rate-of­
return formulae allow utilities to earn a "rate of return in excess of 
their actual cost of capital"'" but also because of the problem of the 
moral hazard. 138 A firm faces a moral hazard when it makes reckless 
131. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text. There are those who argue 
that the Averch and Johnson theory of the regulated firm is overstated See Brock­
way Comments, supra note 6. Two examples support this position. Both Wisconsin 
Electric and New England Electric Systems diversified their investments, failed to 
invest in large scale nuclear generation technology, and showed significant profits. 
See HIRSH, supra note 20, at 157-58. An alternative explanation offered for the over­
investment in technology had to do with who the investment decision makers were 
at that time. Engineers, whose self-conception and worth were tied into engineering 
technology, saw further investment in increasingly larger plants as an affirmation of 
their importance . .See Brockway Comments, supra note 6. 
132. See Baumol & Sidak, supra note 80, at 842. 
133. See Averch & Johnson, supra note 129, at 1059-60. 
134. Professor Pierce's reference is to approximately 15 billion dollars of invest­
ments in nuclear power plants with excess capacity, including plants that have been 
entirely decommissioned. See Pierce, supra note 17, at 498. 
135. See id. at 499. 
136. See id. at 506 (citing Averch & Johnson, supra note 129, at 1055). 
137. Averch & Johnson, supra note 129, at 1061, 1062. See generally ALFRED 
KAHN, 1 THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS (1970) 
(describing "the contribution economics can make to government regulation of busi­
ness"). 
138. See supra notes 119·20 and accompanying text. 
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or imprudent decisions influenced by the fact that a third party will 
bear responsibility for the negative consequences of such impru­
dence.'" If the regulatory environment protected utilities from 
losses, there was an incentive to make decisions without adequate 
consideration of the risk of loss. 
Moreover, another theory posits that utilities invested insuffi­
cient resources in forecasting, largely due to their insulation from 
the consequences of inaccurate or biased forecasts.'40 Their decisions 
to invest in new generation capacity at a time when the market was 
unstable'" were predicated upon forecasts that were biased in favor 
of the need for new capacity.'" Alternatively, utilities erred on the 
side of investing when they were unsure about the reliability of 
these forecasts.'" 
A further explanation for utilities' failure to make efficient 
investment choices is rooted in the idea of institutional inertia. 144 To 
the extent utilities' decision makers were insulated from the effects 
of market and technological changes due to regulatory protections, 
they did not have to be nimble and responsive to dynamic condi­
tions. There was little motivation to stray from basing their deci­
sions on intuition coupled with their experience, which at times 
resulted in forecasts and decisions grounded upon faulty prem­
ises.''" 
2. Efficient Decision Making-Ex Post 
An ex post perspective calls for the examination of a decision for 
the purpose of selecting the best policy for future actors. The ques­
139. Borrowed from the law of insurance, a moral hazard is a risk of insulating a 
person or firm from the consequences of their decision making. For example, the 
problem of moral hazard is present when an insured acts recklessly, knowing that it 
is the insurance company that will bear the risk of their imprudent behavior. In 
most insurance contexts, deductible• and co-pays are made part ofinsurance policies 
to provide insureds with an appropriate incentive to minimize their risky behavior. 
The moral hazard problem highlights the necessity ofinvestors tsking responsibility 
for their risky, or even foolish decisions. See generally KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 
120. 
140. See Pierce, supra note 17, at 506-07. The Averch and Johnson model used to 
explain utility investments is not without its critics. One such criticism observes 
that while investments in capital intensive equipment may increase the rate base, 
such investment may also yield greater efficiencies in electricity generation, thus 
lowering the cost to the public. See id. Given the lag that often results between the 
time costs are lowered and when customer rates respond, utilities benefited from the 
period of time when costs were lowered, but rates had not yet dropped. See id. 
141. See supra note 37-50 and accompanying text. 
142. See Pierce, supra note 17, at 505-07. 
143. See id. 
144. See Brockway Comments, supra note 6. 
145. See Pierce, supra note 17,' at 504, 524-26; see also KAHN, supra note 137, at 
175-76; Averch & Johnson, supra note 129, at 1061. 
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tion in the present context is what policy choice (compensation or no 
compensation) results in firms' optimal behavior in the future. 
Compensating utilities for their transition losses sends the mes­
sage that the expenditures they made in forecasting future trends, 
including market trends, technology advances, and future changes 
in legal rules, were sufficient. Thus, compensation provides no in­
centive in the future for utilities to devote further resources to accu­
rate predictive tools. Moreover, compensation signals others observ­
ing this market that significant capital investments in rapidly 
changing technology may be made without seriously considering the 
risk of obsolescence. Such a policy choice also broadcasts to other 
unstable, changing, regulated industries"• that they may be pro­
tected from the adverse consequences of their inefficient or high­
risk decisions and that such decisions may be made with impunity. 
The grant of compensation to utilities for their transition losses 
therefore encourages and rewards imprudent investments. 
Moreover, compensation for transition losses may also be 
deemed by the market as an externality that interferes with the 
market's intuitive response to a change in its equilibrium.'" This is 
especially true if the action or investment iii retrospect was harmful 
or imprudent in the first instance. 148 Arguably, the decision to invest 
in large-scale nuclear-technologies during a period of instability in 
the market and at a time of the emergence of anti-nuclear senti­
' ment and environmental consciousness is suggestive of impru­
dence.140 The market can best deal with these flawed decisions in a 
way that will discourage future imprudence by letting the market 
react to the transition to competition without mandated compensa­
tion. 
B. The Reliance Theory 
Many of the arguments offered for compensation for transition 
losses are based on the theory of reliance .... The reliance theory in 
the context of market-based transitions is as follows: the firm relied 
146. For a discussion of unstable markets and legal rules, see infra notes 147-61 
. and accompanying text. 
147. See Kaplow, supra note 93, at 551 ("Transitional relief constitutes an exter­
nality that disrupts the market's response to the risk imposed by uncertainty con­
cerning future government action."). 
148. Kaplow uses the example of the regulatory prohibition of a harmful product. 
In this circumstance, a retroactive application of the prohibition (with its attendant 
tranaition losses) is more appropriate than if the rule change was completely unan­
ticipated and not in response to a potential harm to society. See id. at 551-52. 
149. See supra note 45. 
150. The reliance argument has also been made under the contract-related rubric 
of promissory estoppel. See Sidak & Spulber, Deregulatory Takings, supra note 10, 
at 931-33. 
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upon a set of assumptions and on the status quo in arriving at their 
profit prediction and because of unanticipated and unplanned for 
changes a positive return on investment was not realized. There­
fore, the State (or some other third party) ought to make up the 
difference. 
The question of the appropriateness of compensation based on 
the theory of reliance turns on a number of factors. Implicit in the 
reliance argument is the claim of a lack of notice or foreseeability of 
the risk of change. The strength of the argument also turns upon 
the degree of the market's stability. The question of whether a par­
ticular market is unstable depends upon when the market changes 
first occurred, as well as the degree and magnitude of those 
changes. Conspicuous changes over a long period of time strongly 
suggest foreseeability. 
AI! noted above, the electric power market experienced a consid­
erable upheaval as early as the 1970s."' As the reliability of world 
fuel supplies became more precarious, electricity demand declined 
and social and environmental energy-related concerns became more 
compelling.'" Accordingly, the public's relationship with the regu­
lated market shifted in response to these. changes and the market 
became increasingly unstable."" Customers who could seek alterna­
tive energy sources did.' .. Once energy produced by the monopoly 
provider became expensive enough to encourage industrial consum­
ers to enhance their co-generation capabilities,'" those who would 
benefit began to make investments in smaller energy generation 
technologies. From that point forward, utilities were on notice that 
industrial customers were leaving the market, thus decreasing 
utilities' customer bases. The signal.of market volatility was broad­
cast prior to many of the expenditures for which utilities are cur­
rently seeking recovery."" Changes in legal rules that further facili­
tated alternative energy generation followed: . 
151. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text. 
152. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text. 
153. In a recent article, Professor Jill Fisch addressed the issue of retroactivity 
and its effects. See Fisch, supra note 93, at1058-63. In proposing a new framework 
for retroactivity analysis, she focuses upon the stability of the market in which 
change occurs in evaluating how the law should deal with the effects of such 
changes. See id. Dubbing her doctrinal analysis an "equilibrium approach," she ar­
gues that when rule changes disturb stable markets or structures, efficiency and 
fairness suggest that retroactive effects ought to be minimized. See id. Conversely, 
when a change in law impacts an unstable market, then retroactive effects do not 
have a significant impact, and thus should be borne by the affected parties. See id. 
154. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
155. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
156. See Hirsh, supra note 2, at 156-61. 
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Not only can we infer notice from the circumstances surround­
ing the changes in the market, technology, and legal rules over a 
period of at least twenty years,"" but there are also records of spe­
cific instances of utility investors' notification that they may not get 
a return on the full measure of their investments.'58 For example, 
Long Island Lighting Co. disclosed in its 1988 annual security hold­
ers' disclosure statement that investors might not be compensated 
for losses incurred in connection with the abandoned Shoreham 
nuclear power plant. 159 Thus, utilities were aware of the signals of 
change being broadcast to the market. They simply failed to re­
spond to these signals. 
Moreover, a simple claim of "reliance" as justification for com­
pensation ignores the normative dimension of this issue-such as 
whether or not this reliance, and the assumptions underlying it, 
was reasonable under the circumstances. AB stated previously, in­
vestment value changes in response to changes in legal rules and 
market conditions.'60 A nuanced perspective on the concept of reli­
ance recognizes that investors will make decisions based upon their 
evaluation of the probability of change in legal rules as well as 
changes in relevant market forces.'" Accordingly, the reliance posi­
tion is overly simplistic in that it implicitly assumes that the prob­
ability of any change is zero. 
V. 	 THE SO-CALLED "REGULATORY CONTRACT"-A CHALLENGE TO 
THE PREDICATE ASSUMPTIONS 
A further argument advanced by advocates of transition loss re­
covery by utilities conceives of the relationship of the utility and the 
public as based in contract. Proponents of this conception see regu­
lation as an agreement, or contract'62 between the utility and the 
regulator-as-agent-of-the-legislature-as-representative-of-the­
public. They argue that one of the central responsibilities of regula­
157. See infra notes 158-59 and accompanying text. 
158. See Elizabeth A. Nowicki, Denial ofRegulatory Assistance in Stranded Cost 
Recovery in 11 Deregulated Electricity Industry, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 431, 449 (1999) 
(citing Long Island Lighting Co., 1988 Annual Report to Shareholders (1988)); see 
11lso Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., Form 10-K, 1, 6-7 (Mar. 29, 1996) (visited Mar. 
12, 1999) <http://www.sec.gov.Archivesledgar/data/71932/100000719329600000009. 
txt>. 
159. See Nowicki, supra note 158, at 449. 
160. See id. 
161. See Kaplow, supra note 93, at 517-18. 
162. This is also sometimes alternatively referred to as a "regulatory compact" or 
"regulatory bargain." See generally Sidak & Spulber, Deregulatory Takings, supra 
note 10; see 11lso supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text (describing the rhetoric 
atid its influence in the industry and academic discussion of t"he transition loss is· 
sue). 
684 RUTGERS LAWREVIEW [Vol.52:649 
tors is to define service territories and assign investor-owned utili­
ties to such territories.'"' Utilities are correspondingly required to 
offer reliable, consistent electric power to all who work and reside in 
the service area. In exchange, utilities are granted exclusivity in the 
market and a "fair rate of return"'" for capital invested. Accord­
ingly, the argument concludes, a revision of the regulatory scheme 
that introduces competitive electricity providers to the service terri­
tory constitutes a breach of this agreement, which entitles the util­
ity to damages. 
A. Claimed Historical Basis for the "Regulatory Contract" 
The conclusion that the regulatory scheme is contractual in na­
ture is not supported by the industry's regulatory history. Some 
scholars have tried to trace the contractual conception of regulation 
to the nineteenth century's municipal franchise grants to utilities.'" 
The franchise framework put in place then was supplanted by regu­
lation. The franchise arrangement was repudiated in favor of regu­
lation because of the arrangement's inflexibility and its inability to 
adapt to changing technological environments."• Indeed, it was the 
contract-like characteristics of municipal franchises, including the 
inherent difficulty of modifying rates and standards of service, that 
led to the current non-contractual regulatory relationship.'6 ' As Pe­
ter Bradford, former public utility commissioner and expert on the 
history of public utilities, observed in his testimony before the 
. Maryland Public Service Commission, "[i]t makes little sense to 
argue that regulation embodies the very contractual attributes that 
it was intended to correct."168 
Notwithstanding some early courts' recognition of contractual 
arrangements when faced with an explicit contract between the 
State and the regulated ind1:1stry,'69 the "regulatory contract"'" label 
163. See Sidak & Spulber, Deregulatory Takings, supra note 10, at 879. 
164. See supra note 127. 
166. See Sidak & Spulber, Deregulatory Takings, supra note 10, at 905-06. 
166. See Bradford Testimony, supra note 17, at 20 (citing PHILIPS, supra note 6, 
at 130-132). 
167. See id. 
168. Id. 
169. See Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 427 (1837) 
(discussing the regulatory scheme of an explicit contract provision contained in the 
corporate charter). In finding a contract-based arrangement, but not one including a 
term providing perpetual protection from market competitors, Chief Justice Taney 
stated, "in grants by the public, nothing passes by implication." ld. at 546. In his 
concurring opinion, Justice McLean stated that a charter granted to the operator of 
a bridge should be construed, by analogy by the "same rule that governs contracts 
betwe~n individuals." Id. at 558 (McLean, J., concurring); see also ITt re Binghamton 
Bridge, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 51, 82 (1865) (recognizing a provision in a corporate charter 
granting a monopoly as a contract). But see Washington & Baltimore Turnpike Co. v. 
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was first used to refer to the present-day regulatory framework in 
1983.171 This characterization of regulation gained favor among ad­
vocates of transition loss recovery and today is very much a part of 
the lexicon."' Disturbingly,· such a notion has gained favor among 
those advocating for transition loss reimbursement and has been 
presented to PUCs and state legislatures in their deliberations on 
the transition loss issue. There is, however, no historical foundation 
for the award of contract damages for transition losses. 
B. The Conceptual "Regulatory Contract" 
The success or failure of a "regulatory contract" paradigm turns 
on a number of basic contract-related issues. The threshold issue is 
whether a contract was formed in the first instance. To conclude 
that a contract has been formed, one must first establish and iden­
tify the parties to the contract, and then the circumstances of nego­
tiation, bargain, consent, and mutuality of obligation between such 
parties. Assuming arguendo a contract's proper formation, recovery 
for transition losses must be addressed and provided for in the con­
tract's substantive terms. 
Those advocates urging the existence of a "regulatory contract" 
do not, however, squarely address the critical issue of the identity of 
the contract parties. Moreover, even if the parties to this ostensible 
contract are identified, the fundamental doctrinal elements neces­
sary for contract formation were not present.'" There is little direct 
evidence of bargaining, consent, or mutuality of obligation between 
any of the possible parties. Further, even if the proper formation of 
a contract is assumed, there is no support for the conclusion that 
Maryland, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 210, 213 (1865) (failing to enforce a contract in the ab­
sence of explicit contractual terms); see also David B. Toscano, Note, Forbearance 
Agreements: Invalid Contracts for the Surrender ofSovereignty, 92 COLUM. L': REV. 
426, 452-53 (1992) (observing a connection between the unmistakability doctrine and 
the Charles River Bridge case). 
170. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
171. Peter Bradford observed in his testimony to the Maryland Public Utility 
Commission that the earliest use of the term "regulatory compact" was in a PUC 
record of a rate proceeding in Washington State. See Washington Uti!. & Transp. 
Comm'n v. Pugent Sound Power & Light Co., 62 P.U.R. 4th 557, 581-83 (Wash. Uti!. 
& Transp. Comm'n 1984); Bradford Testimony, supra note 17, at 23. 
172. See PHILIPS, supra note 6, at 21 (citing Irwin M. Stelzer, The Utilities of the 
1990s, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 1987, at 20); see also Sidak & Spulber, Deregulatory Tak­
ings, supra note 10, at 857-58; Sidak & Spulber, Givings, Takings and the Fallacy, 
supra note 13, at 1105. 
173. In addition to the claim of a breach of a formal contract, parties may claim 
damages based upon the doctrine of quasi-contract or unjust enrichment. Such a 
claim is based, not on the notion of a promise, but on the idea that one who is un­
just;ly enriched ought to repay to one who enriched, in the am'ount of the benefits 
conferred. See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS§ 2.20, at 99-100 (1982). 
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parties to this contract contemplated damages for compensation by 
consumers for losses incurred by investors. 
1. Parties to the "Regulatory Contract" 
Sidak and Spulber, in their argument favoring recognition of a 
"regulatory contract," gloss over the issue of who the parties to this 
contract are.'" References are made to the electricity consumer as a 
contract party,"' to "[b]argaining between consumers and firms un­
der the auspices of the regulatory agency,"176 and to contracts be­
tween the "sovereign power and private citizen[s]."177 In what is per­
haps the clearest articulation of the identity of the parties to the 
"regulatory contract," Sidak and Spulber state that "the regulatory 
contract is between the utility and the regulatory commission, as 
the agent of the legislature, which in turn represents the general 
public."178 Moreover, notwithstanding the confusion surrounding the 
identity of the utilities' counterparty to the "regulatory contract," 
Sidak and Spulber clearly conclude that it is the public who must 
compensate the utilities for losses incurred in the transition from 
monopoly to competition."' 
The regulator-as-agent-of-the-legisl!iture-as-representative-of­
the-public as the identified contracting party strains the conclusion 
that because the legislature modified the legal rules affecting the 
market, the public ought to pay damages. J8Q For instance, if the gov­
ernment, acting through its agents, breached a written, mutually­
consented-to-contract, entered into with a private party, then costs 
174. See Sidak & Spulber, Deregulatory Takings, supra note 10, at 879-930. 
175. See id. at 879. 
176. ld. at 890. 
177. ld. at 899. 
178. Id. at 907. . 
179. See id. at 930 ("[C]onsumers compensated the utility under cost-of-service 
regulation for the value of service delivered. The services consumed cannot be re­
turned, and reasonable payment has already been made. Thus, the remaining com­
pensation that need be made by consumers in this case is the regulated firm's rate 
base plus a fair rate of return to capital investment."). 
180. There is no evidence that legislatures acted as agents of the public in enter­
ing into a "regulatory contract. • While agents may possess powers arising in three 
different ways, (1) expressly granted or impliedly authorized by the principal; (2) 
apparently authorized; and (3) inherently authorized, it is outside the law of agency 
to both imply authority based upon the ostensible cast of a principal's vote and then 
further imply that a regulatory enactment by an agent of the government was in­
deed a contract between the government as agent and the public and principal. See 
W. EDWARD SELL, SELL ON AGENCY 3 (1975); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Sympo­
sium, Public Contracts, Private Contracts, and the Transformation of the Constitu­
tional Order, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 597, 611 (1987) (distinguishing between ex­
plicit contracts entered into by the government and regulatory enactments, and 
arguing 'that the government may influence its contracts through ~egulation, but 
such regulation is not contractual in nature). 
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of the breach could not be passed on directly to the customers of the 
non-breaching private party.'" It is absurd to conclude that custom­
ers, because they represent the public who elect legislators, should 
be held liable for damages. Likewise, any argument that identifies 
the "regulatory contract" as between the regulator-as-agent-of-the­
legislature-as-representative-of-the-public and the utility, and that 
concludes that losses incurred by the utility in its transition from 
monopoly holder to market competitor ought to be paid for by the 
public, is without doctrinal support. 
Even if one accepts the premise that a "regulatory contract" was 
formed between the regulator-as-agent-of-the-legislature-as­
representative-of-the-public an'd the utility, the public is not a party 
to the contract, but rather a third party beneficiary.182 The third 
party beneficiary doctrine states that third parties may enforce a 
contract made for their benefit,"• but may not be held responsible 
for damages in the event of the contract's breach.184 In the classic 
181. It may, however, be passed on to the consumer in the form of increased tax 
liability, but that is not what is being contemplated by legislatures seeking to de­
termine who ought to pay for transition losses. When the government seeks to redis­
tribute losses through the imposition of a tax, the distribution of losses is greater 
than the compensation scheme that is being advocated by transition loss recovery 
proponents. 
182. Courts have regularly addressed the issue of whether welfare and other 
benefit recipients have a private right of action to enforce their entitlement to the 
benefit at issue. See Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 
U.S. 41, 55 (1986) (noting that the "'contractual right' at issue in this case bears 
little, if any, resemblance to rights held to constitute 'property' within the meaning 
of the Fifth Amendment .... the provision simply was part of a regulatory program 
over which Congress retained authority to amend in the exercise of its power to 
provide for the general welfare .... [it] did not rise to the level of 'property'"); see 
also Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 ·U,S. 587, 608 (1987); Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hol­
lowbreast, 425 U.S. 649, 651 (1976); United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 492 
(1973). In such cases, plaintiffs are claiming a beneficial interest in benefits flowing 
from a statute, not a contract. Professor Waters makes the point that it is the status 
of an individual in relation to either a statute or a contract that leads to the cause of 
action. See Anthony Jon Waters, The Property in the Promise: A Study of the Third 
Party Beneficiary Rule, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1109, 1116 (1985). 
183. See, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (stating that non-party plaintiffs 
may sue on a contract theory if they are "one of the class for whose especial benefit 
the statute was enacted") (quoting Texas & Pacific R.R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 
39 (1916) (emphasis in original)). 
164. Cases suggest that the third party contract beneficiaries have what rises to 
the level of a property interest in the contract benefits, and as such have a cause of 
action for breach. Cf Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1970) (holding that 
the termination of welfare benefits rose to the level of a property interest due to 
individuals' reliance on these benefits); Davis v. Ball Mem'l Hosp. Ass'n, 640 F.2d 
30, 43 (7thCir. 1986) (holding that indigent people needing hospital care had a prop­
erty interest in the hospitals complying with the Constitution and the Hill-Barton 
Act); Euresti v. Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115, 1118 (10th Cir. 1972) (permitting a cause of 
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third party beneficiary case, it is the beneficiary of one party's con­
tract who is suing to redress some abrogation of benefit to which it 
claims an entitlement.186 
For example, tenants of a housing project sued, as third party 
beneficiaries, the project owners for assistance payments that were 
overdue as a result of the owner's negligence.186 The project owners 
had entered into a contract with the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development ("HUD") under which the owners were obli­
gated to comply with certain administrative requirements for HUD 
to remit funds for the benefit of the project's tenants.'" The court 
said that because the contract for tenant assistance between the 
project owners and the federal government was made for the ten­
ants' direct benefit, they were entitled to bring suit as third party 
beneficiaries.'" 
The situation presented by the utilities seeking damages for 
breach of the "regulatory contract" is the reverse of this model. 
First, there is no actual contract between the government and the 
utility-merely a conceptual contractual model inferred from an 
amalgam of behavior, statutes, and proceedings.'.. Second, it is the 
utilities, not the public-as-third-party-beneficiary, that are claiming 
a breach of the "regulatory contract." Moreover, the utilities are 
action against a hospital for denying care to indigents patients based on their enti­
tlements under Title VI of the Public Health Service Act). The most common cur­
rent-day application of this rule in the context of the government as a party to a 
contract, can be traced to Charles Reich's ground-breaking proposal that government 
benefits ought to be treated as recognizable property interests. See Charles A. Reich, 
The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 785 (1964) (arguing that because of people's 
increasing dependence upon governmental benefits for their basic needs, these bene­
fits should be treated as "property interests"). But see Bowen, 477 U.S. at 51; Atkins 
v. Parket, 472 U.S. 115, 129 (1985) (stating that individuals have no property enti­
tlement rights to governmental benefits); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 326 
(1971). 
185. See, e.g., Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1270 (7th Cir. 1981); Ayala v. Bos­
ton Hous. Auth., 536 N.E.2d 1082, 1088 (Mass. 1989). But see Falzarano v. United 
States, 607 F.2d 506, 512 (1st Cir. 1979); Little v. Union Trust Co., 412 A.2d 1251, 
1253 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1980) (holding that because there was no intention on the 
part of the promisee to bestow direct benefits upon tenants as third parties, there 
could be no recovery). Even if one could argue that consumers were a party to the 
"regulatory contract," consumers were never obligated to buy electricity from the 
utilities-and therefore any such contract would be illusory. 
186. See Holbrook, 643 F.2d at 1264-65. 
187. See id. 
188. See id. 
189. See Sidak & Spulber, Deregulatory Takings, supra note 10, at 887 (analogiz­
ing the regulatory contract to the English Constitution, and identifying it as com­
prised of a "bundle of public utility statutes, utility commission precedents, adjudi­
catory aecisions, rulemakings, hearings on the record, formal notic~s of proposed 
rulemaking, and public commentary"). 
689 2000] 	 TRANSITION LOSSES 
seeking recovery from these purported third party beneficiaries, a 
theory of recovery that is without support in the body of contract 
doctrine. The third party beneficiary doctrine has evolved to protect 
the interests of third parties who are the direct beneficiaries of con­
tractual agreements between two other parties. Therefore, it is in­
equitable, as well as contrary to established contract doctrine, to 
require the public-the third party beneficiary-to pay for damages 
upon this ostensible contract's termination. 
2. 	 Offer, Acceptance, Consent, and Mutuality of Obligation 
Even assuming away, for the moment, the regulator-as-agent­
of-the-legislature-as-representative-of-the-public "identification of 
contract party" problem, the issue of contract formation remains. 
Basic contract doctrine tells us that in order to find the existence of 
a contract, there must be both an offer and acceptance of terms.'"' 
Moreover, to get to the point of acceptance, there must be negotia­
tion, bargain, and consent on the part of the parties.'" In the party­
shifting world of transition loss recovery advocates, however, it is 
not clear which party is deemed to have consented to the terms of 
this ostensible contract. 
a. 	 Assuming the Contract Parties are the Public and 
the Utility 
Assuming, arguendo, that the parties to the "regulatory con­
tract" are the public and the utility, then there was no formal, ob­
jective manifestation of consent on the part of the public. 192 Contract 
doctrine tells us that consent to a contract must be manifested by 
both parties in some form;"' the more explicit the consent, the less 
uncertainty surrounding its existence.'"' The regulated utilities' 
190. See Arthur L. Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal 
Relations, 26 YALE L.J. 169, 169 (1917) (examining the factors that must be present 
to form the legal contractual relationship). 
191. See generally JOHN G. CROSS, THE ECONOMICS OF BARGAINING 3-15 (1969); 
see also supra note 32 (discussing the various politically based theories of regulation 
and positing the regulation may arise because of the power and influence of various 
interests groups, and not necessarily, in all cases, come about because of the public 
interest). 
192. See "Stop the Bailout" Coalition Statement, Don't Charge Consumers for 
Utilities' Past Mistakes (last modified Aug. 1997) <http://www .local.org/stop­
bail.html>. 
193. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 173, at 113-18. 
194. The objective theory of contracts states that there must be a manifestation of 
mutual assent. As Judge Easterbrook stated: 
Walters stoutly maintains that he subjectively intended to be bound 
and he wants to invite a jury to infer the same about Telstar. 
. . . Yet 'intent' does not invite a tour through Walters's'cranium, with 
Walters as the guide.... 'The intent of the parties [to be bound] must 
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monopoly was presented to the public, but its direct consent and 
approval was not sought.' .. The public's casting of votes for legisla­
tors who in turn vote for legislation that results in regulatory mar­
ket oversight is not tantamount to consenting to be bound to a con­
tract.'.. 
Moreover, as noted previously, the regulatory framework was 
created at the initiation of the utilities themselves, the party with 
the greater resources and cohesive interests, to serve their profit­
related ends. It is questionable whether the regulation of this mar­
ket was enacted with the full assent (taking into consideration re­
source and informational imbalances) of the public.'"' These differ­
entials result in an inequality in bargaining power. It is therefore 
difficult to argue that the behavior of the public, as captive custom­
ers of utility monopoly holders, ought to be interpreted as consent to 
a contract. Consent to a form of regulation is not the same as con­
sent to the substantive details of any rate base or structure ap­
proved by the utility and the regulatory authority. Notwithstanding 
some of the benefits received by the public by virtue of the regula­
tors' involvement, 190 the parties did not reach an express contractual 
necessarily be derived from a consideration of their words, written and 
oral, and their actions.' ... Secret hopes and wishes count for nothing. 
The status of a document as a contract depends on what the parties 
express to each other and to the world, not on what they keep to than­
selves. ... 
The objective approach is an essential ingredient to allowing the par­
ties jointly to control the effect of their document. If unilateral or se­
cret intents could bind, parties would become wary, and the unwritten 
word would lose some of its power. The ability to fix the consequences 
with certainty is especially important in commercial transactions that 
are planned with care in advance. 
Skycom Corp. v. Telstar Corp., 813 F.2d 810, 814-15 (7th Cir. 1987). 
195. But see supra note 32, describing, in general, various theories of origin of the 
regulatory state. The social and historical origins of regulation, however, does not 
necessarily rise, for purposes of contract formation, to the level of consent. 
196. See supra note 180. 
197. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text. 
198. Notwithstanding the sound historical basis for the capture theory's explana­
tion for the genesis of the regulation of this industry and its corresponding benefits 
to the industry owners, the regulatory framework has offered consumers some bene­
ficial effects as well. For example, many states require utilities to disclose to con­
sumers the lowest available rate, provide discounted prices for low income or elderly 
customers, and limit disconnection of service to households that include the infirm, 
infants, or the elderly. As long as one firm provides service to all consumers in a 
given service area, the costs of these protections can be fairly and evenly distributed. 
With the advent of industry restructuring in many states, some of these consumer 
protective measures may be in jeopardy. See Jerrold Oppenheim, Consumer Law 
Remedies for Failure to Disclose Electricity Service Discounts and Protections 2-3 
(Aug..1998) (on file with author). Other consumer protections that ~DaY be lost when 
the industry is restructured include affirmative protection against redlining, re­
quirements to disclose credit fees in connection with the extension of credit to cer­
691 2000] TRANSITION LOSSES 
agreement, and a "meeting of the minds" cannot be inferred from 
the behavior of the parties."" 
In a commercial context, evidence of parties' meeting of the 
minds is found in a contract's express terms, or in the absence of 
such express terms, in the course of the parties' dealings. Again, 
merely because there was assent to a regulatory arrangement does 
not mean that the arrangement rises to the level of a contractual 
relationship. If every statute resulting in a regulation was deemed 
to be a binding contract with an unlimited duration between the 
public and the party affected by the regulation, then upon every 
rule change, the party responsible for such change (presumably the 
public, who vote for legislators who change rules) would be liable for 
breach of contract damages.200 The public may have indirectly con­
sented to being regulated,'" but there was no expression of consent, 
viewed either objectively or subjectively, to a contractual relation­
ship.202 Moreover, there was no affirmative consent on the part of 
tain customers, ancillary fee and charge disclosures, conservation education and 
assistance. See id. at 2-4. 
199. Courts have referred to the identification of a "meeting of the minds" as a 
manifestation of assent to .contract. Most cases, however, do not describe this as a 
subjective manifestation of intent-but an objective one in which there must be an 
apparent and provable "meeting of the minds." Indeed, under section 2-204 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, case holdings are consistent with the objective theory of 
contract. See generaUy Computer Network, Ltd. v. Purcell Tire & Rubber Co., 747 
S.W.2d 669, 675 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that to ascertain a true meeting of the 
minds the parties must have had an objective manifestation of intent); see also Sidak 
& Spulber, Deregulatory Takings, supra note 10, at 888 ("Even if there were no ex­
plicit documentation at all of the relationship between the regulator and the firm, 
the regulatory contract would still represent a meeting of the minds."). 
200. But see infra Part V.B.4 (discussing the unmistakability doctrine). This doc­
trine states that "to deem a state ,legislative enactment a contract [between the state 
and the party affected by the legislation) for the purposes of the Contract Clause, 
there must be a clear indication that the legislature intends to bind itself in a con­
tractual manner." Parker v. Wakelin, 123 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1997). 
201. But see supra note 32 and accompanying text describing and outlining the 
various theories of regulation and positing that the capture theory, whereby regula­
tors' interests are "captured" by the regulated parties, is the theory best supported 
by the electric utility industries' history. 
202. Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 20 speaks to the issue of the de­
fective formation ofagreements. It states: 
(1) There is no manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange if the 
parties attach materially different meanings to their manifestations 
and (a) neither party knows or has reason to know the meaning at­
tached by the other; or (b) each party knows or each party has reason 
to know the meaning attached by the other. 
(2) The manifestations of the parties are operative in accordance with 
the meaning attached to them by one of the parties if (a) that party 
.does not know of any different meaning attached by the o.ther, and the 
other knows the meaning attached by the first party; or (b) that party 
has no reason to know of any different meaning attached by the other, 
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the public to an express contractual term providing that the public 
would compensate utility owners in the event of the introduction of 
market competition. No such term has been recognized or identified 
even by transition loss recovery advocates, or revealed in any of the 
composite of documents claimed to comprise the "regulatory con­
tract.""" 
Because there was no consent, either to the conceptual contract 
or a specific term addressing loss recovery, there was no contract 
formation and no liability for damages for breach, as between these 
parties.""' This conclusion finds support in the work of Morris 
Cohen.206 More than half a century ago, Cohen observed that in­
cluded in the realm of contract are arrangements between parties 
where there has been no affirmative bargaining or assent to the 
terms.206 As an illustration, he set forth an example of a public 
transportation passenger paying her fare and thereby being subject 
to the "terms of an agreement" between the passenger and the rail­
way."" Citing this as an "excess of contractualism,"208 Cohen con­
cluded that the relationship between the customer and the service 
provider may be one governed by law, but it is "pure fiction" to say 
that it came about as a result of any "agreement of the wills of the 
parties.""" Notwithstanding the fact that the customer voluntarily 
engaged the services ofthe transportation provider,210 the absence of 
and the other has reason to know the meaning attached by the first 
party. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 20 (1981). 
203. See supra note 189 describing the amalgam of documents that according to 
some theorists, comprise the "regulatory contract. • 
204. See supra note 189. 
205. Cohen discusses both the social roots of contract law as well as the relation­
ship between the stateand contracting parties. See generally Morris R. Cohen, The 
Basis of Contract, 46 HARv. L. REV. 553 (1933). In his view, the law of contract is 
inexorably tied to the realm of public law in that the sovereign power of the state 
plays a central role in enforcing and filling in the terms of essentially voluntary 
agreements. See id. at 586. Most, if not all, contracts contain an element of public 
interest and the view that contracts are formed exclusively as a result of the expre!­
sion of the will of the parties ignores the role the state plays not merely in contract 
enforcement, but in defining some of the terms ofprivate agreements. See id. at 585­
92. 
206. See id. at 568. 
207. SP.e id. at 568-69. 
208. See id. 
209. Id. at 569. Cohen further cites the example of the worker and employer 
relationship and how the agreement between these two parties is referred to as a 
"labor contract.• See id. Similarly, absent in this relationship are the power to 
negotiate on the part of the employee and the inability on the part of the worker to 
sigilificantly alter the terms of the agreement between the partie,s. See id. 
210. Even if the railway held a transportation monopoly along the passenger's 
desired route, the passenger could have opted to walk. Similarly, while electricity is 
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coercion on either party's part does not necessarily suggest con­
·Sent'" or a contractual relationship."' 
Furthermore, consent can be expressed in a variety of contexts. 
One can consent to a wealth transfer with a gun to the head, or con­
sent to onerous lease terms in a tight rental market. The validity of 
the former expression of consent would be subject to the contract 
defense of duress, but the validity of the latter would have to be 
evaluated in light of substantive and procedural fairness concerns. 
Normative choices have to be made about the validity of the consent 
given, and a recognition of the need for· normative evaluation of 
consent must be central to the inquiry of whether, in a given con­
text, a contract has been formed."' 
b. 	 Assuming the Contract Parties Are the State-Acting­
Through-the-Regulator and the Utility 
Assuming, in the alternative, that the parties to the "regulatory 
contract" are the State-acting-through-the-regulators and the utility 
(notwithstanding the fact that it is the public from whom compen­
sation is being sought), it is similarly difficult to identify objective 
and affirmative negotiation, bargaining, and consent. Sidak and 
Spulber look to the relational contract theory to support their con­
clusion that a contract was formed."' They characterize the "regula­
tory contract" as an arrangement that relies on "'rough formulae or 
mutual agreement to adjust the contract to current situations,'" and 
use agency doctrine to explain how the regulator-as-agent-of-the­
commonly recognized as a necessity, most persons can live, albeit primitively, with­
out it. 
211. Cf Waters, supra note 182, at 1113 (noting the third party beneficiary doc­
trine in which a party not involved in a contract may sue to enforce intended bene­
fits from the contract through a private suit). 
212. Cf. id. 
213. Targeting the focus of the issue of contract formation on the issue of consent, 
disciples of an alternative contract theory, known as the Libertarian Consent The­
ory, view consent as the objective manifestation of an intention to transfer an enti­
tlement. See generally Randy Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. 
REv. 269 (1986). At the root of this theory, however, are certain aesumptions about 
who holds entitlements. See id. According to this theory's proponents, entitlements 
serve to define the boundaries between the individual and the State. See id. Once 
entitlements are recognized and established, the way such entitlements are trans­
ferred is by consent. See id. This theory, however, assumes the existence of a prior 
distribution of entitlements and begs the question of the origin of entitlements. See 
id. If one accepts the conception that property rights are not static boundaries which 
define the limits of an individual's autonomy, but rather socially constructed rules 
that evolve out of shared values and experiences, then the Libertarian view of con­
sent does not fully answer the question of whether a contract has been formed. See 
. id. It simply offers a framework for determining, once entitl!'ments have been estab­
lished, how entitlements are transferred. See id. 
214. See Sidak & Spulber, Deregulatory Takings, supra note 10, at 887-90. 
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public acts to "negotiate the terms and administer the contract over 
time."2 " The application of this doctrine to the regulation of the 
electric power market does not support the conclusion that a con­
tract has been formed. Indeed, a disciplined application of the rela­
tional contract theory leads to the opposite conclusion. 
The relational contract theory conceives of contract as an 
arrangement whereby an exchange takes place, but the nature and 
terms of the exchange are defined with reference to the "power and 
normative positions" of the parties.21 ' Accordingly, consent is viewed 
not as a rigid, one time, objective manifestation of a party's inten­
tion to contract, but as a process, which can be inferred from the 
relationship formed between the parties. 217 The substantive terms of 
the contract, to the extent not fully spelled out at the outset, gain 
content from the norms of cooperation, fairness, and response to 
changed c~rcumstances. 216 
The relationship that has evolved between the State-acting­
through-the-regulators and the utilities is, in part, due to resource 
limitations of the regulators, reflective of an informational imbal­
ance."'• Utilities have historically had control over the flow of infor­
mation available to regulatory bodies and, as a result, regulators 
have had to rely heavily on the utilities' version of the facts in set­
ting their regulatory policies. 220 This resource and informational 
distribution suggests a power imbalance. If one is looking at the 
process of electric power market policy making with reference to the 
"power and normative positions" of the parties, one may conclude 
that because of the regulators' (and the public's) lack of negotiation, 
215. I d. (quoting Victor P. Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 
BELLJ. EcoN. 426, 428-29 (1976)). 
216. See Ian MacNeil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations 
Under Classical, Neoclassical, a'!d Relational Contract, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854, 889 
(1978). This theory can be contrasted with the "neoclassical theory" of contract, 
which has as its focus the terms and circumstances of the parties' original agree­
ment. See id. at 890. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 5 (1979) 
(defining contract as "a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law 
gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a 
duty"). 
217. See MacNeil, supra note 216, at 889-90. 
218. See i4. at 895. 
219. See McArthur, supra note 13, at 866 n.359 (citing JOSEPH KALT, ET AL. RE­
ESTABLISHING THE REGULATORY BARGAIN IN THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY 48 
(1987)); see also MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USE OF POLITICS 66 (1964); 
THEODORE LOW!, THE END OF LIBERALISM 94-97 (1979). 
220. See GoRMLEY, supra note 15, at 31-33. "[G]overnment institutions are highly 
responsive [to their constituencies], but only to the inputs they receive. Those in­
puts-in the, form of legal briefs, statistical compilations, feasibility studies, and 
customer surveys-come primarily from regulated industries, which spend enormous 
amoimts of money on formal presentations in regulatory agency proceedings. • Id. at 
31-32. 
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bargain, and consent to a contractual arrangement, no "regulatory 
contract" was ever formed. 
Moreover, mutuality of obligation, another essential element to 
the finding of an enforceable contract, is absent. 221 There were no 
reciprocal promises made by the State-acting-through-the­
regulators .and the utilities with the intent that both parties be le­
gally bound by such promises. 222 The state is free to change the legal 
rules at any time-and it often does. 228 At no point did the state le­
gally bind itself, for an infinite duration, to the regulatory ar­
rangement that is in the midst of transition. Accordingly, the ab­
sence of mutuality of obligation leads to the conclusion that there is 
no contract.,.. 
3. Terms of the "Regulatory Contract" 
To discuss whether the terms of the "regulatory contract" pro­
vided for transition loss recovery, one must assume the proper 
formation, and therefore the existence, of a contract. Proceeding 
upon this assumption, if the parties to the agreement (either the 
State, the regulators, the State-acting-through-the-regulators, the 
regulator-as-agent-of-the-legislature-as-representative-of-the-public 
or the public and the utility) memorialized their positions with 
explicit and clear contractual terms outlining the consequences of a 
transition to a competitive market, then it would be hollow to argue 
that the utilities are not entitled to compensation for any such 
adverse consequences. In such a circumstance, the parties (no 
matter who they are deemed to be) would be required to honor all 
221. In a case against the PUblic Utilities Commissioners ofNew Hampshire, the 
Commissioners argued against the existence of a regulatory contract in their opposi­
tion brief to plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, based in part on the lack of 
plain contractual langilage, no evidence of intent to contract inferred from circum- · 
stances and behavior of the parties, as well as lack of mutuality of obligation. See 
Defendants' Opposition to PSNH's Motion for Summary Judgment at 9-36, Public 
Service Co. v. Patch, 87 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.N.H. 2000) (No. 97-97-JD (NH)) & (97-121 
L (Rl)) [hereinafter Defendants' Opposition]. The Commissioners argued with re­
spect to the mutuality of obligation issue that, under the specific facts of their case, 
any performance obligation found in the documents framing their regulatory ar­
rangement were "so discretionary and conditional that neither party can claim the 
other was legally bound to do anything." ld. at 28-29. 
222. See Crellin Techs., Inc. v. Equipmentlease Corp., 18 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1994) 
("The law requires mutuality of obligation as a prerequisite to a binding bilateral 
contract."). 
223. For example, during the 105th Congress, there were 4874 bills introduced in 
the House of Representatives and 2655 bills introduced in the Senate. See [1997­
1998 Transfer Binder] Cong. Index (CCH) at 14,294 & 28,445. 
224. U.C.C. § 2-204, governing contracts for the sale of goods, offers an interesting 
analogy. This section provides that contracts must be definite enough to allow (1) a 
clear determination of breach and (2) the calculation of damages. See U.C.C. § 2-204 
(1994). 
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they are deemed to be) would be required to honor all the terms of 
the contract and the breaching party would pay damages, if any, 
upon its breach. No transition loss recovery advocate, however, has 
been able to identify any such explicit term in any of the composite 
of documents, statutes, provisions, or hearing records claimed to 
comprise the "regulatory contract.""" 
In the absence of such an explicit contractual term providing for 
loss recovery, the next inquiry is whether such a term is implicit in 
the "regulatory contract."226 If terms implicitly providing for transi­
tion loss recovery are identified, then any missing feature or ele­
ments of such a term are inferred based upon common law contract 
principles.'" Alternatively, if consequences flowing from the market 
transition affecting the electric power industry are deemed to be 
totally contractually unspecified, then upon a challenge, courts may 
engage in an ex ante normative analysis to determine how the par­
ties would have resolved the issue, had they anticipated it."' 
a. Implicit Remedial Terms 
The first issue that must be examined in order to determine 
whether a term specifying the remedy for the breach of the "regula­
tory contract" is implicit is the extent to which the current-day 
regulatory reform was foreseeable, considered, and assented to by 
the parties. Under common law, to imply contract terms not explic­
itly included in the contract by the parties, courts will look to the 
extent to which the parties directly or indirectly assented to what is 
sought to be implied. 229 Such an expression of agreement to the 
claimed term can be found by reference to an "objective extrinsic 
event," but a court cannot "impos[e] its own conception of what the 
parties should or might have undertaken."'" Recovery advocates 
claim that full recovery of transition losses is an implied term of the 
"regulatory contract"; however, because full recovery is a material 
225. See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
226: See Sidak & Spulber, Deregulatory Takings, supra note 10, at 880-83. 
227. Taking these inquiries a step further analytically, one policy analyst makes a 
distinction between what he refers to as complete and incomplete contracts. Com­
plete contracts are those in which responsibilities of the parties are explicitly or 
implicitly defined in every foreseeable circumstance. See James Boyd, The "Regula­
tory Compact• and Implicit Contracts: Should Stranded Costs be Recouerable?, 19 
ENERGY J. 69, 73 (1998). In contrast, an incomplete contract is one in which a clr­
cumstance occurs that was both contractually unspecified and unforeseeable. See id. 
228. See id. 
229. See, e.g., Joseph Martin, Jr., Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher, 417 N.E.2d 
541, 543 (1981) (stating that "before the power of law can be invoked to enforce a 
promise, it must be sufficiently certain and specific so that what was promised can 
be ascertained"). · 
230. See id. at 543-44. 
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proVISion with far-reaching consequences, one would think that 
transition loss recovery advocates would be able to point to some 
extrinsic evidence of those parties' intention to include such a term. 
Another approach under the common law is to apply the "de­
fault rule" whereby, in the event a court is faced with an incomplete 
or absent contract term, it either inserts a term that the parties 
would have wanted had they agreed, or a term most commercial 
parties would have agreed to in similar circumstances.'" Clearly, 
the utilities would have wanted to include such a term, but it is 
difficult to imagine what circumstances would have induced the 
public-or even the regulator-as-agent-of-the-legislature-as­
representative-of-the-public-to agree to cover the losses incurred 
by the utilities in the event of a transition, without some form of 
compensation, in the form of rate discounts to compensate them for 
bearing such risk. In considering which party is better able to bear 
and therefore insure against major risk-between the public and 
the utility or the regulator-as-agent-of-the-legislature-as­
representative-of-the-public and the utility-it is clear that the util­
ity, with its superior information and resources, is in the better po­
sition.'32 As noted previously, the industry itself is in the best posi­
tion to predict and dictate technological advances and correspond­
ing market changes .... Moreover, the legal rules governing the mar­
ket have been changing in response to these advances (which in­
clude case law as well as rate case proceedings) over the past 
twenty years. The norms of cooperation and fairness suggest that 
between utility investors and their ostensible counter-party, the 
utility is in the superior position to predict changes, as well as to 
insure and mitigate the consequences of such changes."" 
231. See id. 
232. As observed by policy analyst James Boyd, "[u]tilities are clearly more expert 
than regulators in the precliction of technological change in power generation and .. 
. are in the best position to adjust production choices and investment decisions to 
these changes." Boyd, supra note 227, at 79. 
233. See HIRSH, supra note 20, at 145. 
234. An alternative approach to the consideration of the incomplete contract term 
dilemma has been offered by Professors Ian Ayres and Richard Gertner in circum· 
stances where terms are incomplete as a result of strategic bargaining by the par­
ties. See Ian Ayres & Richard Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contract: A Eco· 
nomic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 93 (1989). In such circumstances, 
Ayres & Gertner argue that the terms should be determined according to what the 
parties would not have wanted, in order to provide an incentive to be more forthcom· 
ing in the bargaining process and therefore improve the bargain's efficiency. See id. 
Their challenge to the "what the parties would have wanted" approach to filling in 
incomplete contracts is on the basis of high transaction costs. See id. If one assumes 
that the absence of an explicit term in the "regulatory contract" provicling with 
specificity exactly who should bear the transition losses was a strategic decision on 
the part of the utility, then pursuant to the Ayres/Gertner theory the common law 
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b. Remedial Terms Not Considered by the Parties 
Alternatively, if the "regulatory contract" is viewed as an in­
complete contract, meaning the parties never considered the issue 
of remedial terms in the event of a "breach," the inquiry then be­
comes, how would the parties have allocated the liabilities for the 
surfaced losses in the evei).t of transition to competition. 236 In an­
swering this question, one can reasonably assume that the parties, 
in making such a decision, would try to maximize each of their re­
spective interests. They would consider which party is better able to 
adapt to or insure against such occurrences at the least cost.236 
As stated previously, adding a term to an incomplete contract 
providing for compensation to utilities for their transition losses 
communicates an approval of the · type and degree of investment 
made in forecasting. The addition of a remedial term to an incom­
plete "regulatory contract" provides no incentive for utilities to in­
vest their resources in more accurate predictive tools in the future. 
Moreover, the "reading in" of such a remedial term provides an 
incentive to other similarly situated parties to make significant 
capital investments in rapidly changing technologies without con­
sidering the risk of obsolescence (or even to include the conse­
quences of the risk of obsolescence in their contracts). Other regu­
lated industries operating in unstable and changing markets could 
simply enter into contracts (or argue that their regulatory ar­
rangement was contractual in nature) with impunity, but omit any 
mention of remedial term. This would lead to both flawed decision 
making as well as a greater number of parties bargaining around 
difficult terms.,.., Parties who are protected from the adverse conse­
quences of their decisions are far more likely to engage in inefficient 
or simply high-risk behavior."" 
4. The Unmistakability Doctrine 
The unmistakability doctrine states that "in order to deem a 
state legislative enactment a contract for the purposes of the Con­
tract Clause, there must be a clear indication that the legislature 
intends to bind itself in a contractual manner."""' Legislation is pre-
remedy would be what the party engaging in strategic bargaining would not want. If 
this party is the utility, then it is the utility that ought to absorb the costs oftransi­
tioning from monopoly to regulation. See id. 
235. See Boyd, supra note 227, at 78. 
236. See id. 
237. See supra -notes 98-99 and accompanying text. 
238. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text. 
239. Parker v. Wakelin, 123 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1997); see also Edward J. DeBar­
. tolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Coimcil, 485 U.S. 568, 575 
(1988) ("[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise seri­
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sumed to be policy oriented in nature and not intended to create 
private contractual or vested rights.""' Courts will not infer contrac­
tual rights from legislation that does not unambiguously express 
the power or intention to create a contract. 241 
This point is well illustrated in the recent case of United States 
v. Winstar Corp.' .. To encourage the turn around of the ailing sav­
ings and loan industry, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (and 
the FSLIC), through regulatory enactments, favorably treated 
thrifts with respect to the calculation of their capital reserve re­
quirements."" The "express arrangement" between the regulators 
and the thrifts was subsequently superceded by the enactment of 
the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 
1989 ("FIRREA"),"" which disallowed such favorable treatment.""' 
The Supreme Court upheld the Federal Circuit Court's finding of an 
express contractual agreement between FSLIC and the thrifts, cit­
ing clear language in documents that were incorporated and inte­
grated into the thrifts' merger agreements.,.. Because FIRREA pre­
cluded the government from fulfilling its contractual promise, the 
United States was liable for breach of this express contra~<t. 247 
The benefits conferred on the thrifts in Winstar, with respect to 
their capital reserve requirements, were neither generalized regula­
tory pronouncements nor the amalgam of ratemaking decisions, 
statutes, and regulations, as in the case at hand. 248 The Wins tar 
Court-found it significant that not only did the parties affirmatively 
and explicitly agree to the capital reserve arrangement, but also 
that such contracts included a "risk shifting" term, allocating 
''losses [to the government] arising from future regulatory 
change.,.. . ' · 
Again, transition loss recovery advocates have been unable to 
point to any legislation that specifically created private contractual 
rights. Moreover; because the "regulatory contract" identifies at 
best a compendium of documentation, including statutes, regula­
ous constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such prob­
lems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.") (citing 
Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118 (1804)); Bowen, 477 U.S. at 52. 
240. See Dodge v. Board ofEduc., 302 U.S. 74, 79 (1937). 
241. See Parker, 123 F.3d at 8. 
242. 518 u.s. 839 (1996). 
243. See id. at 853. 
244. Pub. L. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989). 
245. See id. 
246. See Winstar Corp. v. United States, 64 F.3d 1531, 1540, 1542-43 (Fed. Cir. 
1995). 
247. See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 870. 
248. See supra note 182. 
249. Winstar, 518 U.S. at 881. 
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tions, and ratemaking decisions, and is at worst a conceptual con­
tractual arrangement, under the presumptions of the unmistakabil­
ity doctrine, an implied governmental contractual obligation is 
without support. 260 AB the New Hampshire Public Utility Commis­
sioners stated: 
In order to properly analyze [the utility's] contract clause 
claim, it is critical to appreciate the extraordinary character of the 
contract rights that [the utility] claims it secured from the State. 
According to [the utility], the State has accorded it an unfettered 
right to perpetuate its monopoly status to charge rates set as [sic] 
pre-determined levels for an indeterminate period of time and irre­
spective of a finding by the . . . Legislature that current electric 
. ,., 
rates are unreasonably high. 
VI. DEREGULATION AS A TAKING 
One of the central claims made by the advocates of transition 
loss recovery is that the introduction of competition to a market 
previously dominated by a single monopoly supplier has "taken" 
value from the incumbent supplier, and that such a taking constitu­
tionally requires compensation. The Fifth Amendment to the Con­
stitution reads, in pertinent part, "nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation."''" Colloquially re­
ferred to as the "Takings Clause," this constitutional provision has 
enabled courts to determine when governmental action affecting a 
property owner's interest requires compensation.'""' 
250. See generally Defendants' Opposition, supra note 221, at 36-41. To illustrate, 
the Supreme Court recognized a contractual obligation on the part of the govern­
ment in circumstances where the statutory language read, the "'States covenant and 
agree with each other and With the holders of any affected bonds ....~ United 
States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 18 (1977) (quoting from 1962 N.J. Laws, 
c.8, § 6; 1962 N.Y. Laws c.209, § 6)). The "sovereign act defense" doctrine similarly 
states that a "public and general" sovereign does not trigger contractual liability. See 
Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458, 461 (1925). 
251. Defendants' Opposition, supra note 221, at 40-41. 
252. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
253. Takings have been found in cases of the State's physical invasions of prop­
erty as well as when government regulation has the effect of abrogating property 
interests. The leading physical invasion case is Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan 
CATV Corp., where the Court found the intrusion of a cable television wire on a 
property owner's apartment building to be compensable. See Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982). The court held that a "perma­
nent physical invasion• of someone's property constituted a per se taking. See id. at 
419. The Court, in justifying its per se rule stated, "the property owner entertains a 
historically rooted expectation of compensation, and the character of the invasion is 
qualitatively more intrusive than perhaps any other category of property regula­
tion." ld. at 441. Sidak and Spulber make the argument that allowing competitors 
7012000] TRANSITION LOSSES 
A. Regulation as an Exercise ofPolice Power 
The police powers of the states are inherent and these powers 
are protected from federal intrusion by the Constitution's Tenth 
Amendment.264 Pursuant to their police power, states have the right 
to enact regulations in the name of the physical, moral, social, and 
economic well being of the public.,.. 
The United States Supreme Court first addressed the question 
of the constitutionality of the states' regulation of private busi­
nesses in the 1877 case of Munn v. Illinois .... The Court said that 
certain industries, "affected with a public interest" could be prop­
erly regulated by governmental action.207 Businesses that "become a 
thing of public interest and use" and function as a "virtual monop­
oly" may be regulated pursuant to the State's police power .... 
access to incumbent utilities' power grid (meaning the poles and wires) constitutes a 
taking. See Sidak & Spulber, Deregulatory Takings, supra note 10, at 952; see also 
FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 252 (1987) (addressing the issue of 
whether the state could regulate rates charged under a voluntary attachment agree­
ment, and by distinguishing Loretto on the facts, held that as long as the rates were 
not confiscatory, there was no taking). 
254. The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution provides that, "[t)he powers not 
delegated to the [federal government,) ... nor prohibited ... to the States, are re­
served to the States ...."U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
255. See ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER, PuBLIC POLICY AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 7 (1976). 
256. 94 U.S. 113, 124-25 (1877) (establishing the right of government to regulate 
and set rates for monopoly providers acting in the public interest). The regulatory 
state can trace its roots to Europe and the American colonies as far back as the 18th 
century, when mercantilism was the dominant system for the organization and con­
trol of commerce. See Conference Addendum: Regulating in Pursuit.ofEfficient and 
Just Prices, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 913, 914 (1995). 
257. See Munn, 94 U.S. at 130; see also Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 521-23 
(1898) (upholding the right of the State to regulate prices charged to the public by a · 
business "affected with a public interest"), overruled by Federal Power Comm'n v. 
Natural Gas PipeLine Co. of Am., 315 U.S. 575, 602 (1942). Article I, Section 8 of the 
Constitution, the Commerce Clause, grants the federal government the power to 
regulate interstate businesses. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8. The provision grants Con­
gress the power "[t)o regulate Commerce ... among the several States." U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8, c!. 3. Article I also grants Congress .certain "implied powers" to "make all 
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing 
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the 
United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c!. 18. 
258. Munn, 94 U.S. at 132 (internal quotations omitted). In 1924, the Court fur­
ther clarified the contours of states' powers to regulate businesses in holding that 
"[w)hether competition between utilities shall be prohibited, regulated or forbidden 
is a matter of state policy." Tennessee Elec. Power v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 141 (1924). 
In 1934, the Supreme Court in Nebbia u. New York, upheld the state's authority to 
regulate the business on the basis of the state's police powers, coupled with the 
power of the legislature to regulate intrastate commerce. See Nebbia v: New York, 
291 U.S. 502, 536 (1934) (concluding that while there was "no closed class or cate­
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Public utilities have been among the prime candidates for state 
regulatory action .... Because utilities provide a distinct and neces­
sary service to the public, ... they have been held to what is colloqui­
ally known as the "public interest standard.""'' This standard recog­
nizes that the continued operation of public utilities is in the public 
interest.'"' The controls and limits placed on the industry in the 
form of regulation are designed to balance the needs of the public 
with the constitutionally protected interests of the regulated indus­
try owners.'68 
gory of businesses affected with a public interest,• regulation affecting the pricing of 
milk was nonetheless a reasonable use of governmental authority). The doctrine 
originally announced in Munn v. Illinois has been regularly refined and affirmed by 
courts in their identification of features of businesses functioning in the interest of 
the public. See German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 411 (1914) (uphold­
ing the regulation of fire insurance premiums in the name of the public's interest); 
Brass v. Stoeser, 153 U.S. 391, 403-04 (1894) (upholding the state legislature's regu­
lation of grain elevator and storage facility owners based on the concept of the in­
dustry operating in the public's interest). 
259. Public utilities have been defined as a "diverse group ofbusinesses that have 
been subjected over several decades to detailed local, state, and federal regulation of 
rates and service. • PHILLIPS, supra note 6, at 4. 
260. These services include transportation, telecommunications, natural gas, and 
electricity and have been broadly characterized as functions of the State. See 
PHILLIPS, supra note 6, at 4-5. 
261. The standard has also been referred to as the "public interest, convenience 
and necessity" standard. Daniel J. Smith, Note, Stay the Course: A History of the 
FEC's Response to Change in the Cable Industry, 13 J.L. & POL. 715, 721 (1997) 
(citing Glen 0. Robinson, The Federal Communications Act: An Essay an Origins 
and Regulatory Purpose, in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT 
OF 1934, 14-15 (1989)). Justice Brandeis said in his dissent in New York State Ice Ca. 
v. Liebman, when a business is "so pervasive and varied as to require constant de­
tailed supervision and a very high degree of regulation .... it is common to speak of 
the business as being a 'public' one, ... [and] [i]t is to such businesses that the des· 
ignation 'public utility' is commonly applied; or they are spoken ofas 'affected with a 
public interest.'" New York State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 301 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citing German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 
408 (1914)). 
262. Justice Frankfurter said in his dissent in Federal Power Commission v. Hope 
Natural Gas Co.: 
For our society the needs that are met by public utilities are as truly 
public services as the traditional governmental functions of police and 
justice. They are not less so when these services are rendered by pri­
vate enterprise under governmental regulation. Who ultimately de­
termines the ways of regulation, is the decisive aspect in the public 
supervision of privately-owned utilities. 
Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 625 (1944) (Frank­
furter, J., dissenting). 
263. Progressive leader Samuel 0. Dunn explained his view of the role of regula­
tory agencies in 1914: 
"The management of public utilities should be left in the hands of the 
owners or those that they choose to represent them. The regulating 
commissions should be strong enough in personnel and statutory 
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It is well-settled law that rate regulation (which directly affects 
investor rate of return on investments) is within the scope of the 
State's police power until the point at which it becomes confisca­
tory.',. The Supreme Court, in Federal Power Commission v. Hope 
Natural Gas,"• stated that so long as the statutory rate setting 
standard of "just and reasonable" was met (meaning that rates 
would be set at a level that enabled "the company to operate suc­
cessfully, to maintain its financial integrity, to attract capital, and 
to compensate its investors for risks assumed"), a court will not sec­
ond guess the rate order by deeming it a taking.,.. State public util­
ity commissions, in their rate setting capacity, have had to meet the 
challenge of striking a balance between meeting the reasonable 
needs of the public and providing utility investors with a fair rate of 
return.287 
power to exercise corrective authority over the management when the 
acts of the management are unreasonable and unjust to the public." 
THE ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
U.S. REGULATORY AGENCIES 9 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1973). 
Cases specifically addressing the permissible contours of public utility regu­
lation have identified the scope of authority of public utility commissioners, as dele­
gated by the legislature: 
[PUC orders] are final unless [they are] (1) beyond the power which it 
could constitutionally exercise; or (2) beyond its statutory power; or 
(3) based upon a mistake of law. But question of fact may be involved 
in the determination of questions of law, so that an order, regular on 
its face, may be set aside if it appears that (4) the rate is so low as to 
be confiscatory and in violation of the constitutional prohibition 
against taking property without due process of law; or (5) if the Com­
mission acted so arbitrarily and unjustly as to fix rates contrary to 
evidence, or without evidence to support it; or (6) if the authority 
therein involved has been exercised in such an unreasonable manner 
as to cause it to be within the elementary rule that the substance, and 
not the shadow, determines the validity of the exercise of the power... 
. In determining these mixed questions of law and fact, the court con­
fines itself to the ultimate question as to whether the Commission 
acted within its power. 
Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Union Pac. R.R., 222 U.S. 541, 547 (1912); see also 
Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 890 F.2d 435, 
439 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Southern Cal. Gas Co. v. California Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 591 
P.2d 34, 40 (Cal. 1979); United Inter-Mountain Tel. Co. v. Tennessee Pub. Serv. 
Comm'n, 19 P.U.R. 4th 589, 591 (Tenn. 1977). 
264. See Federal Power Comm'n, 320 U.S. at 598. This holding was a restatement 
of the principle declared by the Court in 1923 in Bluefield Water Works & Imp. Co. u. 
Public Sero. Comm'n. In Bluefield, the court noted that an array of factors must be 
considered by courts in their evaluation of a fair rate of return, rather than the ap­
plication of a rigid formula. See Bluefield Water Works & Imp. Co. v. Public Serv. 
Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679, 692-93 (1923). See generally A. Lawrence Kolbe & William B. 
Tye, The Duquesne Opinion: How Much "Hope" is There for investors in Regulated 
Firms?, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 113, 127 (1991) (describing the risks of rate regulation). 
265. 320 u.s. 591 (1944). 
266. Id. at602,605. 
267. See GORMLEY, supra note 15, at 24. 
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These principles were recently affirmed by the Supreme Court 
in Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 268 wherein the Court held that 
regulated public utility investors may not be allowed a return on all 
of their capital invested due to the proper exclusion of a portion of 
the investment from the rate base.""' What constitutes a "fair rate of 
return" to public utility investors has been assiduously studied by 
the courts'" and the resolution of the question turns on whether the 
utility's "rates are inadequate to compensate current equity holders 
for the risk associated with their investments under a modified 
prudent investment scheme."'" It is within a state's police power­
and not a taking-to affect a utility's earnings, as long as the earn­
ings rema,i.ned "just and reasonable."272 
That is not to say, however, that a state's exercise of its police 
power can never rise to the level of a taking. Justice Scalia explic­
itly said in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission,213 that the 
act at issue was a lawful exercise of South Carolina's police power, 
but "the government's power to redefine the range of interests in­
cluded in the ownership of property was necessarily constrained by 
constitutional limits.""' These limits, as defined by the Lucas Court, 
included permanent physical invasions and deprivations of all eco­
nomically beneficial uses of property."' The post-Lucas question 
268. 488 U.S. 299 (1989). In this case, the Court addressed the question of.the 
constitutionality of a state statute prohibiting the inclusion of the "cost of construc­
tion or expansion" of electric power facilities "until such time as the facility is used 
and useful in service to the public." ld. at 304 (quoting 66 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1315 
(Supp. 1988)). Absent a showing that a particular rate setting methodology results 
in unreasonable rates that jeopardize the utility's financial integrity or otherwise 
fail to compensate shareholders for their investment risks, no taking will be found. 
269. See id. at 314. 
270. See, e.g., Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 301-02 (1989) (decid­
ing that a statute precluding inclusion in utilities' rate base plants that were not · 
used and useful was not an unconstitutional taking); Federal Power Comm'n v. Tex­
aco Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 387-90 (1974) (ruling that FPC may indirectly fix rates 
charged by small gas producers so long as rates are just and reasonable); Federal 
Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 585-86 (1942) (stating 
that ratemaking authority was not constrained by the Constitution against the mak­
ing of pragmatic downward adjustments in gas rates unless such reductions were 
confiscatory); Covington & Lexington Turnpike Rd. Co. v. Sanford, 164 U.S. 578, 598 
(1896) (holding that a statute reducing tolls able to be charged by a turnpike which 
were below those allowed by a general statute was Constitutional). 
271. Dusquesne Light, 488 U.S. at 312. This means that investor's rate of return 
must be evaluated in light of the relative investment risks incurred. 
272. See id. 
273. 505 u.s. 1003 (1992). 
274. Id. at 1014 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)). 
275. See id. at 1027. "[P]roperty owner[s] necessarily expect[] the use[] of[their] 
property to be restricted, from time to time, by various measures newly enacted by 
the State in legitimate exercises of its police powers." ld. 
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therefore, is whether a state, in its enactment of regulations, ex­
ceeds the scope of its police powers by engaging in acts that are 
"categorically compensable," or otherwise exceeds Constitutional 
limits.276 
B. Regulation, Deregulation, and Police Power 
Unless the regulation of public utilities under the rubric of the 
states' police powers is confiscatory, is of a "categorically com­
pensable" nature, or goes "too far,""' such state action is sanctioned 
when the property affected is "used in a manner to make it of public 
consequence.""" The utilities' operations be.come "clothed with a 
public interest" and thus are subject to state-imposed constraints."" 
These circumstances result in some erosion of utility owners' abso­
lutist property interest because of the devotion of a portion of the 
formerly "private property" to the interest of the public.,.. 
Whether the deregulation of the electric power market results 
in a taking similarly turns on the objectives of and justification for 
the regulatory action. In essence, the changes being made to the 
regulatory scheme governing the electric power market constitute a 
re-regulation of this market.281 Through the enactment of laws and 
regulations, the door is being opened to competition in hopes of im­
proving the social and economic well being of the consuming public. 
In the same way that the incumbent firms' relationship with the 
regulatory framework was created pursuant to the states' police 
powers, the states are exercising their police powers to modify and 
recreate all of the competitors' relationships with the market. Ac­
cordingly, the regulation and re-regulation of the electric power 
market is accomplished through the exercise of the inherent police 
powers of the State. Since the State in this context is riot engaging 
in either of the Lucas-identified categorically compensable actions, 
the next step is to determine whether the regulatory scheme has 
gone "too far" by balancing issues of state control with the interests 
of property protection. 
276. See id. 
277. Justice Holmes said in Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415, that when regulation goes 
"too far" it will be recognized as a taking. See infra note 281 and accompanying text. 
278. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877). 
279. See id. 
280. See Gregory S. Alexander, Takings and the Post-Modern Dialectic of Prop­
erty, 9 CONST. COMMENTARY 259, 267-68 (1992); Laura Underkuffier, On Property: 
An Essay, 100 YALE L.J. 127, 142-43 (1990). 
281. It is important to note that the electricity transnrission, distribution, and 
generation assets held by the former monopoly holder are not being seized by the 
state-nor are the utilities being foreclosed from their continued operation. The 
utilities will continue to have the opportunity, in a conipetitive market, to earn a fair 
rate of return. See Bradford Testimony, supra note 17, at 41. 
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C. The Court's Takings Tests 
The starting point for the examination of whether deregulation 
of the electric power industry constitutes a taking is the Supreme 
Court's body of regulatory takings law. Regulatory takings cases 
arguably constitute one of the most confused bodies ofjurisprudence 
and have provided much fodder for scholarly theorizing and criti­
cism.,,. A few distinct, although not easily applied, tests have 
emerged from a line of cases evaluating the extent to which regula­
tions have impinged upon a property owner's rights. 
The seminal case originating the early regulatory takings rule 
is Pennsylvania Coal ·v. Mahon .... Justice Holmes, writing for the 
majority, announced that "while property may be regulated to a 
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a 
282. For example, compare the court's analysis ofKeystone Bituminous Coal Asso­
ciation v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 481-502 (1987) (rejecting a takings challenge 
to a Pennsylvania law limiting the right of a coal company's mining rights), with 
Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413-16 (finding a taking and striking down legislation limiting 
the rights of a coal company's mining rights). Justice Stevens observed in Iris dis­
senting opinion in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting), "[e]ven the wisest lawyers would have to acknowledge great 
uncertainty about the scope of this Court's takings jurisprudence." Id. at 866. See 
generally Alexander, supra note 280; Robert Brauneis, "The Foundation of Our 
'Regulatory Takings' Jurisprudence": The Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes's 
Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613, 619 (1996) (arguing that 
Holmes's opinion in Mahon is the foundation for Rehnquist era taking decision, 
"obscur[ing] its original meanings."); Robert Ellickson, Takings Legislation: A Com­
ment, 20 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL. 75 (1996); Richard Epstein, Pennsylvania Coal v. 
Mahon: The Erratic Takings Jurisprudence ofJustice Holmes, 86 GEO. L.J. 875, 884­
88 (1998) (discussing the features of recent state takings acts); Ronald J. Krotoszyn­
ski, Fundamental ProJierty Rights, 85 GEO. L.J. 555, 560 (1997) (concluding that. 
"the Supreme Court's current liberty-based substantive due process doctrine should 
be extended to fully protect fundamental property rights and to protect nonfunda­
mental property interests from utterly arbitrary or irrational government action."); 
Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost ofLochner: Modern Takings Doctrine and its Impact on 
Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L. REV. 605 (1996) (discussing the correlation between 
Lochner v. New York and the takings doctrine); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Util­
ity and Fairness: Commends on the Ethical Foundations of •Just Compensation 
Low," 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165 (1967) (examining the line drawn between com­
pensable and non-compensable takings); Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In 
Search of Underlying Principles Part I-A Critique of Current Takings Clause Doc­
trine, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1299, 1304 (1989) (noting that wlrile the Takings Clause doc­
trine cases appear to be chaotic, an underlying pattern exists that makes the results 
more predictable); Carol Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 
577 (1988) (discussing the evolution of property rules from clear rules, to muddled 
exceptions, to new clear rules); Carol Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings 
Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1983-84) (exploring Pennsylvania 
Coal v. Mahon and different views ofproperty). · 
283. 260 u.s. 393, 415 (1922). 
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taking.""" What constituted a regulation going "too far" remained 
elusive until 1978 when the Court decided Pennsylvania Central 
Transportation Co. v. New York City .... 
In Pennsylvania Central, the Court examined a claim by the 
owners of New York City's Grand Central Station that a landmark 
preservation ordinance that precluded the erection of an office 
tower above the rail station was a compensable taking. Justice 
Brennan, writing for the Court, set forth the test that has since 
been widely adopted in subsequent regulatory takings cases.,.. 
Courts must examine three distinct issues: (1) the character of the 
governmental action;287 (2) the economic impact of the regulation;288 
and (3) the extent to which the regulation interfered with the 
claimant's investment-backed expectations.289 
The Pennsylvania Central Court offered this balancing test, 
however, without providing any guidance with respect to the rela­
tive weight one should put on each of the three factors. Not surpris­
ingly, regulatory takings cases have at times been decided based 
upon an inconsistent application of these factors to a variety of 
regulatory enactments affecting a broad range of property inter­
ests.290 
1. The Character of the Governmental Action 
The first prong of the Pennsylvania Central test, the character 
of the governmental action, looks to whether the government in 
enacting the regulation is furthering an important public policy.291 
In the context at hand, the governmental action subject to challenge 
is the enactment of regulations allowing competitive electricity pro­
viders to enter heretofore monopoly markets.""" The electric deregu­
284. Id. 
285. 438 u:s. 104 (1978). 
286. See id. at 124. Some courts, however, have adopted the test announced two 
years after Pennsylvania Central in Agins v. City of Tiberon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 
(1980). The Court in this case said a regulation affects a taking if (1) "it does not 
substantially advance legitimate state interests," or (2) "denies an owner economi­
cally viable use[s] of his [property].• Id. 
287. See id. 
288. See id. 
289. See id. 
290. But see Molly S. MoUsie, Looking Inside Out: Institutional Analysis and the 
Problem of Takings, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 591 (1998) (positing that judicial takings 
decisions can be reconciled and explained once politics, legislation, regulation, judi­
cial appointments, and judicial precedents are taken into consideration). 
291. See, e.g., Atlas Corp. v. United States, 895 F.2d 745, 757-58 (Fed. Cir. 1990) 
(finding a public purpose in a statute requiring the decommissioning and clean-up of 
a uranium mill). 
292. The movement toward deregulation's early impetus came from industrial 
consumers concerned about high electric rates. Not surprisingly, states with the 
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lation movement grew out of a concern that stagnation in the indus­
try, technological advances, and changed market conditions had 
made monopoly suppliers of electricity anachronistic. 200 Therefore, 
for the social and economic benefit of the public, the states have 
begun to encourage competition in the market. The state action's 
ultimate objective is to lower electricity costs to the consumer-an 
objective clearly within the scope of an important public policy. 
2. 	The Economic Impact of the Regulation and Interference 
with Investment-Backed Expectations 
The second and third prongs of the Pennsylvania Central test 
are closely related in that both the economic impact of the regula­
tion and the degree of the regulation's interference with the claim­
ants' investment-backed expectations target their focus on the na­
ture of the property interest at issue. Indeed, both tests can only be 
applied after it is determined that the party claiming a taking has a 
property interest worthy of constitutional protection. 
In essence, the takings claim being made by transition loss re­
covery advocates is that the utility investors' property interests are 
being impaired as a result of the market's restructuring. What has 
not been clearly identified, in either the pleadings of cases in which 
this claim is being made, ... or in the academic writings advocating 
for the extension of the takings doctrine to a deregulating market,296 
is exactly what the claimants' "property interest" is. The Supreme 
Court has clearly stated that a reasonable "investment-backed ex­
pectation" must be more than a "unilateral expectation or an ab­
stract need."'"' If "investment-backed expectation" is viewed as a 
more generalized interest in the benefits of the regulated market, 
the policy question implicated is to what extent should the law give 
force to such interest, thereby transforming it from a mere private 
interest to a legally enforceable entitlement."' References to the 
highest electric rates were at the forefront of the deregulation movement­
presumably in their efforts to lower consumer rates. See Comments of Nancy Brock­
way, N.H. Public Uti!. Comm'r, Feb. 9, 1999 (on file with author). 
293. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text. 
294. See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of NHPUC's Opposition to Unitil Power 
Corp., Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 26, Public Serv. Co. v. Connecticut 
Valley Elec. Co. (No. 97-97-JD (N.H.)) & (97-121 L (R.I.)). 
295. See Sidak & Spulber, Deregulatory Takings, supra note 10, at 945-46 ("The 
regulatory contract exists to create the institutional structure of incentives and 
credible assurances for the public utility to undertake the substantial capital costs 
required to perform its service obligations."). 
296. Webb:s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980). 
297. See Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 
822, 827-31 (1993) (discussing legal entitlements and the complexity of identifying 
what interests rise to the level of entitlements and the extent and type of legal force 
due such interests). 
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vague notion of "the institutional structure of incentives and credi­
ble assurances"298 appear to suggest a view that the property lies in 
the institutional structure of monopoly regulation, and all the bene­
fits that flow therefrom. 
a. Property's Evolutionary Definition 
Property is popularly and comfortably conceived of as the em­
bodiment of tangible and intangible things.299 Often, however, prop­
erty is more apt to be viewed as more than just a thing and as some­
thing that extends beyond a derivative of a physical fact.""" A 
broader conception of property recognizes property as the relations 
between persons or other entities301 with respect to things."' Taking 
this view of property even further, some scholars in Hohfeldian tra- · 
dition,308 have noted that the traditional conception of property as 
related to things has disintegrated and been replaced by a frame­
298. Sidak & Spulber, Deregulatory Takings, supra note 10, at 945. 
299. 	 Professor Thomas Grey criticized this idea: 

Most people, including most specialists in their unprofessional mo­

ments, conceive of property as things that are owned by persons. To 

own property is to have exclusive control of something-to be able to 

use it as one wishes, to sell it, to give it away, leave it idle, or destroy 
it. Legal restraints on the free use of one'~ property are conceived as 
departures from an ideal conception of full ownership. 
Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY: NOMOS XXII 69 (J. 
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980); see also STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A 
THEORY OF PROPERTY 16 (1990). 
300. Indeed, much property in our society is of an intangible nature. Consider the 
following: shares of stock, intellectual property, licenses, bank accounts, debt in­
struments, and goodwill. See Grey, supra note 299, at 69. 
301. For example, corporations, partnerships, limited liability companies, and 
other legal entities. See ROBERT E. SWINDLE, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN BUSINESS 
89-116 (1977). 
302. The Supreme Court observed in United States u. General Motors Corp., 323 
u.s. 373 (1945): 
It is conceivable that [the term "property" in the Takings Clause] was 
used in its vulgar and untechnical sense of the physical thing with re­
spect to which the citizen exercises rights recognized by law. On the 
other hand, it may have been employed in a more accurate sense to 
denote the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the 
physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it. In point 
of fact, the construction given the phrase has been the latter. 
Id. at 377-78; see also MUNZER, supra note 299, at 16. 
303. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as 
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 21-23 (1919). Hohfeld, known as 
one of the founders of legal realism, observed that "a claim of property may implicate 
some combination of rights, liberties, powers, and immunities requiring action or 
forbearance on the part of others." Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the 
Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Pro'perty, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 
1045 n.231 (1992) (summarizing Hohfeld's famous analysis). 
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work of legal entitlements."" The potential for the fragmentation of 
rights with respect to things (i.e., one person can have usage while 
another, the right to profits) makes relationships among people 
with respect to things as constitutive of property interests.306 There­
fore, property is a reflection of a collective choice of what kinds of 
interests are signifj.cant and compelling enough to rise to the level 
of a right worthy of legal protection.""' 
Few of even the most ardent advocates of property rights pro­
tection would argue that property is a creature of natural law.'"' 
304.. See Grey, supra note 299, at 72. One of the examples of a legal entitlement 
cited by Professor Grey is the limited liability held by corporations; see also Reich, 
supra note 184, at 733. 
305. See James L. Oakes, "Property Rights• in Constitutional Analysis Today, 56 
WASH. L. REv. 583, 587 (1981). The full list of elements of property rights (some­
times referred to as sticks in the bundle of property rights) are (1) the right to pos· 
sess (meaning either actual physical possession or metaphorical possession in the 
case of intangibles); (2) the right to use (referring to personal eqjoyment); (3) the 
right to manage and control; (4) the right to income and other benefits from the 
thing; (5) the right to the capital (meaning the power to alienate, consume, waste, 
modify or destroy); (6) the right to security (meaning protection from appropriation); 
(7) the power to devise or bequeath; (8) the absence of term (meaning the right to 
have an indeterminate length of tenure); (9) the prohibition of harmful use; (10) 
liability to having the "thing" appropriated for the payment of a debt; and (11) re­
siduary character (meaning the existence of rules governing the reversion oflapsed 
ownership rights. See LAWRENCE BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS 19 (1977) (citing A.M. 
Honore, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS ON JURISPRUDENCE 107-47 (A.G. Guest ed., 
1961)). 
306. See Laura S. Underkuffier-Freund, Takings and the Nature of Property, 9 
CANADIAN J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 161 (1996) (observing that the Supreme Court, in 
its takings jurisprudence, has failed to establish a coherent view of property); see 
also A. ALLAN SCHMID, PROPERTY, POWER AND PUBLIC CHOICE, AN INQUIRY INTO 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 25 (1978). 
307. But see infra note 315. Traditional treatments of property ownership as a 
natural right were based upon the arguments from first occupancy and the Lockean­
based labor theory. See generally BECKER, supra note 305, at 24-80. Ifone is seeking 
to determine the respective rights of parties in a heretofore "unowned" parcel of 
property, the argument from first occupancy has·great intuitive appeal. See id. at 24­
31. This justification comes with some significant restraints and is vulnerable to the 
central criticism that even if appropriation is in accord with a natural right or moral 
law, permanent possession may not be. See id. at 28-30. Similarly, the labor theory 
of property acquisition provides that efforts expended with respect to property enti­
tles one to an interest in that property. This notion rewards those that have invested 
part of themselves in a thing. See id. The flaws in this theory are revealed when it is 
appropriately qualified. When the labor expended is 
(1) beyond what is required morally, that one do for others; (2) pro­
duces something which would not have existed except for it; and (3) its 
product is something which others lose nothing by being excluded 
from, then (4) it is not wrong for producers to exclude others from the 
possession, use, etc. of the fruits of their labors. 
ld. at 41. These qualifications are so limiting that all one can conclude when this 
theory is put into application is that the party who expended the efforts only has an 
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Property is often conceived of as a product of positive law, taking its 
meaning and definition from the social construct of the State.308 To 
the extent that property, in a sense, defines the boundaries of State 
power and control, it is the State that draws these boundaries in 
the first place. 309 AB such, even the term "private property" masks 
the authority the State has in its ability to allocate who holds a 
property right and wrongly suggests that snapshots of resource dis­
tribution are organic and not vulnerable to challenge or abroga­
tion."• 
b. Property Being Taken 
The issue that has been consistently fundamental to the finding 
of a regulatory taking, however, is the abrogation of a property in­
terest. Accordingly, implicit in every regulatory taking claim is the 
presence of an antecedent "property" or "legal right" held by the 
party claiming a· taking. Unfortunately, the issue of what the prop­
erty at issue is or how it is defmed is rarely explicit in regulatory 
takings cases.311 Moreover, the process courts have engaged in to 
entitlement to the tangible results of his efforts if no one else is competing for the 
same goods. See generally id. at 24-80. Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow 
that because one expended efforts with respect to a thing, that one becomes entitled 
to such thing. Perhaps, in some cases, it is more appropriate to compensate the la­
borer with money rather than the object of his efforts. Because the fundamental 
concept behind the labor theory is that one should be rewarded for his labor, and 
not, in all cases, that one should receive the thing labored upon, it fails as a funde­
mental justification for property rights. We have the legal Realists to thank for the 
recognition that property rights are creations of the power of the state and that 
property is allocated to some at the expense of others. See CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, 
POLITICS ,\ND MARKETS: THE WORLD'S POLITICAL ECONOMIC SYSTEMS ]jl7 (1977); see 
also Morris R. Cohen, Property & Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 8 (1927). 
308. See Board ofRegents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) ("Property interests .. 
. are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions 
are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent 
source such as state law ...."); Cohen, supra note 307, at 12 (characterizing prop­
erty rights as "sovereign power compelling service and obedience"). 
309. See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 252, 272-73 (1990). 
310. See id.; see also Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE 
DAME L. REv. 329, 349 (1996) (discussing the importance of property as a symbol for 
all other rights.) 
311. See Underkuffier-Freund, supra note 306, at 165 ("For a concept of such 
crucial significance, the sheer absence of articulation by the Court of [a property's] 
shape, contours, or other identifying characteristics is astonishing. In fact, in the 
mountains of Supreme Court takings jurisprudence in recent years, comparatively 
little attention has been devoted to tlris fi~st, threshold question. The question of the 
'property' involved generally receives superficial gloss, with the Court moving 
quickly to the issue of 'taking. m). 
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identify property is neither consistent nor revealing of a greater 
vision or understanding of the concept ofproperty.312 
The Supreme Court has begun to identify a hierarchy of prop­
erty-related interests worthy of protection by, for example, deeming 
"the right to exclude" and "all economically'beneficial" uses of prop­
erty to be important enough to be categorically compensable."' Re­
grettably, however, the Court has failed to articulate a principled 
justification for its announcement of such distinctions. 
At a minimum, it is clear that the definition of property in the 
takings realm is not confined to tangible property."' It is also clear, 
that while failing to acknowledge it explicitly, the Court has implic­
itly infused normative judgments into its property definitions. 316 The 
Court appears, a number of times, to reject the legal realist notion 
that property rights are socially constructed and adopt what seems 
to be a natural law approach to property's definition."• In doing 
this, the Court skirts the necessity of acknowledging the value 
choices it is making each time it determines a particular interest to 
be a property interest. The dominant approach with respect to the 
identification of property interests in the Supreme Court's takings 
jurisprudence, however, is the recognition that property must be 
defined with reference to previously created state or federal 
rights.m The question in the context at hand is whether the utility 
investors have an entitlement to the regulatory state worthy of gov­
ernment protection. 
312. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384, 388-96 (1994) (identifying the 
property rights at issue as both the "right to exclude," the "right to use" as well as 
referencing both the entire parcel of land owned by claimants as well as the smaller 
portion specjfically affected by the regulatory action); Lucas v. South. Carolina 
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992) (where the court, in attempting to 
define property, posited both "the owner's reasonable expectations" as well as "the 
State's law of property"). 
313. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015-16. 
314. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1001-04 (1984) (stating 
that trade secrets were property); United States v. General Motors, 323 U.S. 373, 
377-78 (1945) (holding rights with respect to a lease was property). 
315. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928) (ruling that investors' 
interests in apple trees were worthy of constitutional property rights protection, 
whereas investors' interests in red cedar trees were not); see also Joseph William 
Singer & Jack M. Beerman, The Social Origins ofProperty, 6 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 217, 
218-19 (1993) (arguing that land distribution in the United States is a result ofgov­
ernment policy and not social evolution). 
316. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 n.2 (1987) (stat­
ing that "the right to build on one's own property ... cannot remotely be described as 
a 'governmental benefitm). 
317. See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc., 449 U.S. at 160-65 (recognizing the 
money deposited in an interpleader fund as "property"). 
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c. Property Rights and the Regulatory State 
Regulation's detractors have clearly and affirmatively charac­
terized regulation as a form of interference with free enterprise."" 
The "market" is viewed as the natural order and any deviating limi­
tations on its rhythmic movement are artificial interventions re­
quiring specific and persuasive justification."• The property rights 
of free market participants are simply viewed as a given. 320 What is 
often not recognized by free market proponents, however, is the fact 
that markets for commerce themselves are the essence of socially 
constructed institutions.'" The State sanctions, enforce, and in some 
circumstances, create the property that trades "freely" in such mar­
kets.822 For example, corporations, LLCs, and partnerships are all 
examples of property created by state law and constitute property 
that is engaged in trade."" Moreover, the State effectuates the en­
forcement of contracts to buy, sell, and use property. Accordingly, 
neither the property, the market, nor its distributional outcomes 
are of natural or organic origin.,.. 
Professors Sidak and Spulber, in advocating for deregulation's 
characterization as a taking, have implicitly adopted the free mar­
ket proponents' conception of property .... In their articles advocat­
ing for utilities' interests, they state that their "overriding concern 
is the protection of private property as the foundation of a competi­
tive economy."328 Indeed, they describe their position as one of 
"defending property rights.""' These seemingly noncontroversial 
statements, presuppose, however, the existence of a property inter­
est in the party claiming deregulation's adverse affects-the utility 
investors. They are viewing property as an absolute and natural 
right, one held exclusively by the utility investors and worthy of 
protection without question.828 
318. See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962); RICHARD 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1977). 
319. See id. See generally Bielak & Spulber, Deregulatory Takings, supra note 10, 
at 873. 
320. See supra note 316 and accompanying text. 
321. See NEDELSKY, supra note 309, at 258-59 (noting the socially-constructed 
nature of so-called free markets). 
322. See generally SWINDLE, supra note 301, at 10-19. 
323. See id. 
324. See NEDELSKY, supra note 309, at 257-59. 
325. See Sidak & Spulber, Deregulatory Takings, supra note 10, at 933-34; see 
also Sidak & Spulber, Givings, Takings and the Fallacy, supra note 13, at 1074. 
326. Sidak & Spulber, Givings, Takings and the Fallacy, supra note 13, at 1074. 
327. ld. 
328. See NEDELSKY, supra note 309, at 259 ("[I]t is surprising how many sophisti­
cated commentators (academic and other) adopt the language of 'interference' with a 
presumptively natural market."). 
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Sidak and Spulber further claim, on behalf of utilities, an enti­
tlement to the regulatory state. 329 They argue that because the de­
regulatory schemes proposed by federal and state legislatures are 
taking away the state of regulation and all the benefits flowing from 
the regulatory environment, the expectations held by the utilities 
are being interfered with, and thus there has been a "taking" under 
the Fifth Amendment.330 This position seemingly adopts what has 
been observed as an "absolut[ist] approach to property ... combined 
with [a] seemingly absolute constitutional guarantee[J."3 " This ap­
proach both ignores the market's history of the State's exercise of 
its police power and the nature of the exercise of power and corre­
sponding changes being contemplated. 
Moreover, what is being claimed to be a transition loss worthy 
of compensation, an ··anticipated shortfall in revenue," is not a 
property interest, but merely an expectation held by utility inves­
tors that they would receive a certain rate of return. Since "unilat­
eral expectations" are not protected property rights under takings 
jurisprudence,"' any regulation that affects such an expectation 
cannot be deemed to be a taking. 
d. Investment-Backed Expectations as Property 
The case for unilateral expectations as property is less substan­
tiated in circumstances where there is the foreseeable potential for 
regulation in the future. 383 In examining cases where regulated in­
dustries claim takings upon re-regulation, courts have regularly 
found that if such industries are operating in a regulatory environ­
ment, they cannot reasonably claim reliance on the status quo and a 
compensable property interest in the current regulatory state. For 
example, in Concrete Pipe & Products of California, Inc. u. Con­
struction Laborers Pension Trust, ... the claimants asked the Court 
to recognize a taking upon the regulatory imposition of a liability on 
329. See Sidak & Spulber,Deregulatory Takings, supra note 10, at 863-64. 
330. See id. at 865. 
331. Underkuffier, supra note 280, at 133. 
332. See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, 449 U.S. at 161 (finding that "a mere uni­
lateral expectation or an abstract need is not a property interest entitled to [Consti­
tutional] protection"); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577-78 (1972) (decid­
ing, on due process grounds, that a unilateral expectation of tenure did not give rise 
to a property right); United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 377 (1946) (rul­
ing that tenants' interests in a lease is not measured on a subjective special use 
basis, taking into account tenants' expectations with respect to the property, but at 
market value). 
333. See generally Marc R. Poirier, Regulatory Takings, § 10.05 (Matthew Bender 
ed., 1999). · 
334. 508 u.s. 602 (1993). 
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a pension plan sponsor.385 The Court examined the claimants' posi­
tion in light of "three factors with particular significance" for tak­
ings claims. 338 First, there was no physical invasion or permanent 
appropriation of the claimant's assets.837 Second, the economic im­
pact of the imposition of liability was not determinative. 
"[D]iminution in the value of property, however serious, is insuffi­
cient to demonstrate a taking."338 Finally, the Court noted that at 
the time the liability was imposed on the plan sponsors, "pension 
plans had long been subject to federal regulation."339 Accordingly, 
"Concrete Pipe's reliance on [the regulation's] original limitation of . 
. . liability ... is misplaced, there being no reasonable basis to ex­
pect that the legislative ceiling would never be lifted."""' Under simi­
lar facts, the Court in Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.'" 
stated "'[t]hose who do business in [a] regulated field cannot object 
if the legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent amendments 
to achieve the legislative end."''" 
In a different but analogous context, owners of state created 
leases for water-bottom lands used to cultivate oysters, in Avenal v. 
United States,"' claimed a compensable taking when subsequent 
regulation foreclosed the opportunity to continue oyster propaga­
tion."" In its application of the three-factor Pennsylvania Central 
takings test, the court observed that the plaintiffs' property right 
came about as a result of their taking "advantage of the existing 
conditions for their own economic benefit. "340 "It is hard for them to 
claim surprise, however, that the pre-existing salinity conditions, 
created at least in part by earlier government activity, were not left 
alone, but were again tampered with to their (this time) disadvan­
tage.""' 
325. See ia. at 605. 
336. ld. at 643. 
337. See id. at 643-45. 
338. Id. at 645. 
339. ld. 
340. ld. at 646. 
341. 475 u.s. 211 (1986). 
342. Id. at 227 (quoting FHA v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91 (1958)); see also 
California Hous. Sec. Inc. v. United States, 959 F.2d 955, 958 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (hold­
ing that the regulated environment in which the association ope•ated abrogated any 
historically rooted expectation of compensation for regulatory action); Lakeview Dev. 
Corp. v. City of S. Lake Tahoe, 915 F.2d 1290, 1295 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that in a 
heavily regulated situation, the parties were on notice that the investment was 
subject to further legislative action). 
343. 100 F.3d 933 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
344. See id. at 935-36. 
345. Id. at 937. 
346. ld. 
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Recently, in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,'" coal operators chal­
lenged the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act, funded by 
premiums assessed against them, as an unconstitutional taking."' 
Justice O'Connor (with three justices concurring and one justice 
concurring in the judgment), found a taking and held that the gov­
ernment action at issue imposed "severe retroactive liability on a 
limited class of parties that could not have anticipated the liabil­
ity.,... In this case, the coal operators' lack of foreseeability of regu­
latory change was dispositive. 
In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,'"" the holder of a trade secret 
claimed that a government regulation requiring disclosure of cer­
tain data, which included the trade secret, constituted a taking. " 1 
The Court, in recognizing Monsanto's trade secret as a property 
right,... decided nevertheless that absent an express promise made 
by the government (acting through the Environmental Protection 
Agency as regulator), Monsanto had no reasonable investment­
backed expectation that its information would remain a secret .... 
Because Monsanto gained "economic advantages" in exchange for 
its submission of information for disclosure, it could not later com­
plain that the government's required disclosure of its trade secrets 
was beyond the scope of the police power .... The Court stated: 
In an industry that long has been the focus of great public 
concern and significant government regulation, the possibility was 
substantial that the Federal Government, which had thus far 
taken no position on disclosure of health, safety, and environ­
mental date concerning pesticides, upon focusing on the issue, 
would find disclosure to be in the public interest.366 
The application of the holdings of these cases to the transition­
ing electric utility market leads to the observation that, pursuant to 
347. 524 u.s. 498 (1998). 
348. See id. at 517. 
349. Id. at 528-29. 
350. 467 u.s. 986 (1984). 
351. See id. at 998-99. 
352. See id. at 1001-04 (citing United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 
373, 377-78 (1945)) ("It is conceivable that [the term "property" in the Takings 
Clause] was used in its vulgar and untechnical sense of the physical thing with 
respect to which the citizen exercises rights recognized by law. On the other hand, it 
may have been employed in a more accurate sense to denote the group of rights 
inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use 
and dispose of it. In point of fact, the construction given the phrase has been the 
latter."). 
353. See id. at 1008. 
354. See id. at 1007-08. 
355. ld. at 1008-09. 
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its police power, what the government giveth, the government can 
taketh away. Benefits were gleaned by these regulated industries 
(oyster propagators, pesticide manufacturers and electric utilities) 
for many years, and the parties were on notice of the possibility of 
prospective changes in the regulatory schemes; Accordingly, there 
are no reasonable investment-backed expectations held by the regu­
lated industries taken by the State upon a modification of the regu­
latory landscape-and thus no compensable taking. 
VII. CoNCLUSION 
The movement toward nationwide deregulation of the electric 
power market has gained momentum. Assuming a competitive 
market will result in lower electricity prices, it may well be a good 
idea. The good in this idea, however, may be lost if the transition 
loss issue is not adequately resolved. Legislatures must make some 
difficult policy choices with respect to whether utilities ought to be 
held harmless from the consequences of their choices during the 
period of monopoly markets. Those in a position to make decisions 
with respect to the allocation of these obligations must critically 
examine the nature of the arguments being put before them-as 
well as these arguments' underlying factual and doctrinal premises. 
The doctrinal premises underlying both the contract-based and 
property-based arguments are flawed .... The parties to this ostensi­
ble contract have never been adequately identified, nor have the 
necessary elements for contract formation been shown. Moreover, 
even assuming the existence of a validly created contractual ar­
rangement, due to the absence of explicit or implicit provisions al­
lowing for recovery of losses by utilities, there is no basis for identi­
fying or implying such a recovery for transition losses from the con­
sumer. Yet this is exactly what a number of state legislatures have 
decided. 
Furthermore, there can be no taking in the absence of a prop­
erty right created by state law. What is being declared as property 
by transition loss recovery advocates is nothing more than, at most, 
a unilateral expectation. Accordingly, this argument fails because 
takings jurisprudence's first foundational principle-a property 
right--c!lnnot be found. Even assuming a property right in the util­
ity is recognized, changes made to a regulatory structure initially 
created by the State pursuant to its inherent police powers under 
current takings jurisprudence, are also within the province of the 
State's police powers. It is incumbent upon policy makers to chal­
lenge these arguments and critically examine their embedded as­
sumptions. 
356. See discussion infra Parts V & VI. 
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Moreover, it is important for legislators to recognize that the 
transition loss issue is not unique to this time and to this industry. 
Rule changes happen on a regular basis, as do market-based 
changes. Risk of change is an element of every investment-and as 
such, it is (or should be) internalized in every investment decision. 
The transition loss issue facing the electric power industry must be 
analyzed in a broader context to fully understand the economic im­
plications of loss recovery. In light of the history of this industry 
and the market it has operated in, policy makers should also con­
sider issues of fundamental fairness. 
